Making Executive Privilege Work: A Multi-Factor Test in an Age of Czars and Congressional Oversight by Klukowski, Ken
Liberty University
DigitalCommons@Liberty
University
Faculty Publications and Presentations Liberty University School of Law
June 2012
Making Executive Privilege Work: A Multi-Factor
Test in an Age of Czars and Congressional
Oversight
Ken Klukowski
Liberty University, kenklukowski@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lusol_fac_pubs
Part of the American Politics Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, and the
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at DigitalCommons@Liberty University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Liberty University. For more
information, please contact scholarlycommunication@liberty.edu.
Recommended Citation
Klukowski, Ken, "Making Executive Privilege Work: A Multi-Factor Test in an Age of Czars and Congressional Oversight" (2012).
Faculty Publications and Presentations. Paper 56.
http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lusol_fac_pubs/56
  
 
31 
MAKING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE WORK: A 
MULTI-FACTOR TEST IN AN AGE OF CZARS AND 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
KENNETH A. KLUKOWSKI* 
   
 I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 32 
 II. CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES IMPLICATE EXECUTIVE 
PRIVILEGE .............................................................................. 34 
 III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALE FOR EXECUTIVE  
  PRIVILEGE .............................................................................. 37 
A. Collision of Constitutional Forces Between Coequal 
Political Branches ......................................................... 39 
1. Congressional Oversight ........................................ 39 
2. Executive Power of the President ........................... 44 
3. Executive Privilege Is Necessary at the  
 Intersection of Separated Powers ........................... 46 
B. The Rationale and Legal Theory for Executive  
 Privilege......................................................................... 49 
 IV. CURRENT EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE ......................... 52 
A. Contextual Observations ............................................... 53 
B. The United States v. Nixon Balancing Test and Modern 
Procedure ...................................................................... 54 
1. What Is Protected by the Current Rule ................... 54 
2. What Is (or May Be) Unprotected Under This  
 Rule ........................................................................ 59 
C. Unanswered Questions Regarding Enumerated Powers 
such as Appointment Power .......................................... 60 
1. Exploring Unresolved Questions ............................ 60 
2. Presidential Appointment Power ............................ 62 
D. The Courts Should Adopt a Multi-Factor Test for 
Interbranch Executive Privilege Cases ......................... 66 
1. Office Created by Congress ................................... 67 
                                                          
* Research Fellow, Liberty University School of Law; Fellow and Senior Legal Analyst, 
American Civil Rights Union; National-Bestselling Author.  George Mason University School 
of Law, J.D. 2008; University of Notre Dame, B.B.A. 1998.  The author wishes to thank 
Professor Nathan A. Sales of George Mason for his thoughtful help and advice, as well as 
Amanda J. Klukowski, Chase E. Klukowski, and Nelson Lund.  This Article is dedicated to 
Caleb A. Klukowski.  
32 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:31 
 
2. Policymaking .......................................................... 67 
3. Extra-White House Origins .................................... 68 
4. Textual Commitment in the Constitution ............... 69 
5. Presidential Involvement ........................................ 70 
6. Nature of Other Actors ........................................... 70 
7. Czars ....................................................................... 72 
 V. COURTS SHOULD REFUSE BOTH RECENTLY-OFFERED 
SOLUTIONS IN FAVOR OF AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH ........ 73 
A. Courts Should Reject Both Proposed Arguments .......... 74 
1. Congressional Arguments ...................................... 74 
2. White House Arguments ........................................ 75 
B. Superior Alternative Approach for the Recent 
Controversies ................................................................. 77 
C. All Three Government Branches—Including Congress—
Will Benefit from not Allowing Congress to Be Involved 
with Executive Branch Appointment Decisions ............. 80 
 VI. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 83 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Political gridlock sometimes forces the federal judiciary to resolve a number of 
disputes between the other two branches of government.  When held by opposite 
parties, Congress and the White House occasionally engage in political battles that 
turn on questions of law, and therefore spill over into the courts.  Eventually, these 
conflicts between the political branches force the judicial branch to revisit its 
doctrine of executive privilege, exploring uncharted constitutional waters.  As recent 
years have often seen a President of one party and Congress held by the opposition 
party, an examination of executive privilege doctrine proves timely and useful to the 
judiciary.  
Executive privilege conflicts are almost unavoidable in times of heightened 
partisan conflict.  Congressional oversight of the executive has been part of 
American constitutional government since George Washington.  Congress requires 
information to perform its constitutional oversight role when formulating legislation 
and in order to responsibly appropriate funds for current and ongoing government 
operations.  Concurrently, the President must withhold certain information to 
properly execute his constitutional duties, given that disclosure of some information 
would harm the national interest.  All other information, however, should be 
divulged in a free and open society where the government answers to the people.  
When information is sought through compulsory means, either by Congress or the 
courts, executive privilege is the doctrine that shields sensitive information from 
disclosure to protect the nation‟s interests, while assuring the disclosure of the 
remainder.  
In the past eighteen years, opposition Congresses controlled by both parties have 
aggressively investigated the White House.  In the 1990s, the Republican Congress  
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investigated Democratic President William Jefferson Clinton on myriad issues, 
culminating in the impeachment of a sitting President when President Clinton lied 
under oath in answering questions regarding his personal life, questions of an 
admittedly embarrassing nature.  In subsequent years, a Democratic Congress 
investigated Republican President George W. Bush on matters at the core of the 
President‟s constitutional powers.  Several U.S. attorneys—political appointees that 
serve at the pleasure of the President—were replaced by the White House.  Two 
committees in the House of Representatives and one committee in the Senate 
investigated this and other matters, demanding to know what the President of the 
United States discussed privately with his immediate advisers about these decisions 
involving the President‟s appointment power.  These committees subpoenaed three 
senior presidential aides in the White House—as well as the attorney general—to 
obtain information regarding these presidential conversations.  The President 
asserted executive privilege to prevent the disclosure of these conversations, and 
several of these matters subsequently went before the courts.  
The presidency of Barack Obama is proving at least as contentious as its two 
immediate predecessors.  Republicans lacked the legal authority to subpoena 
administration officials during 2009 and 2010—a consequence of being in the 
minority in both chambers of Congress.  Republicans, however, won 63 House seats 
in the 2010 midterm elections, thereby regaining majority status in the House, with 
committee chairmanships and compulsory power attending that status.  (This could 
likewise be the case after the next election, possibly with the Senate as well.)  With 
this changing of the guard, the nation may well again witness political 
brinksmanship over access to information involving the President and his 
subordinates.  
This conflict over information has been building for decades.  Fourteen years 
ago, one writer noted that “[o]ver the past two decades, Congress and the President 
have engaged in increasingly bitter constitutional warfare over access to information.  
Two implicit constitutional doctrines have collided in these episodes: executive 
privilege and congressional investigatory power.”1  The situation has only become 
more acrimonious and adversarial in subsequent years.  The Constitution empowers 
Congress to engage in vigorous oversight actions over legislative matters and also 
over executive actions performed by, or involving, congressionally-created offices 
and Senate-confirmed officers.  The Constitution also contemplates an energetic and 
independent chief executive, separate and distinct from Congress, and entitled to 
private deliberations within the White House on the President‟s performance of his 
constitutional duties and exercise of those powers textually committed to him.  
Recent years have upset this interbranch balance of powers, muddying the 
constitutional waters and unmooring current practice from the Framers‟ design.  
Therefore, a clear ruling on the applicability of executive privilege would be helpful 
to clarify the proper boundaries of legislative oversight and restore normative 
interbranch relations.  
                                                          
 1 Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative 
of Executive Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REV. 631, 632 (1997); accord Stephen C. N. Lilley, 
Suboptimal Executive Privilege, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2009) (“Few separation of 
powers issues have been as consistently contentious over the last fifty years as the existence, 
scope, and proper use of executive privilege . . . .”).  
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The courts must resolve such controversies when properly presented in an Article 
III context.  Leaving conflicts unresolved only results in additional litigation and 
political gridlock. It is exceedingly difficult for a court to formulate and apply 
standards to resolve clashes between the political branches.2  Yet, when the political 
branches reach an impasse in a situation that turns on a question of constitutional 
law, the courts should resolve the issue if properly presented in a justiciable case 
once these issues reach a tipping point.  Indeed, when the courts refuse to engage in 
a controversy wherein jurisdiction is proper out of a reluctance to become enmeshed 
in a political matter, that too threatens the courts‟ legitimacy by giving the 
appearance of a dereliction of duty.3  The judiciary should find that executive 
privilege bars Congress from compelling testimony from senior presidential advisers 
in the White House regarding their conversations with the President concerning the 
President‟s use of a power explicitly granted to him in the text of the Constitution.  
But the Court must not allow so-called “czars” in the White House to enjoy any 
confidentiality not afforded to Senate-confirmed department officers, when those 
“czars” exercise anything resembling operational management of government 
activities.  Allowing Congress to force disclosure when executive privilege properly 
applies violates the separation of powers, and therefore, the Constitution protects the 
confidentiality of such conversations.  But allowing the President to refuse 
disclosure when helpful for proper oversight likewise violates the separation of 
powers, and therefore, the Constitution does not countenance such refusals.  A 
decision delineating this distinction should improve interbranch relations by 
clarifying each branch‟s constitutional role.  
This Article begins in Part II by exploring a recent executive privilege case 
between the White House and Congress.  Part III then explains the constitutional 
rationale for executive privilege by surveying the tension between Congress‟s 
Article I powers and the President‟s Article II powers.  Part IV then explains modern 
executive privilege doctrine and the different forms of executive privilege, and also 
proposes a new multi-factor analysis to be incorporated into the current test.  Part V 
moreover explains why the courts should reject both branches‟ arguments on these 
issues in favor of a third approach.  Part VI then ends with the long-term 
implications of executive privilege. 
II.  CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES IMPLICATE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE  
When the White House and Congress are held by opposite parties, conflicts can 
erupt over access to information.  One such recent conflict resulted in litigation 
against two former officials serving under President George W. Bush—White House 
Counsel Harriet Miers and White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten.  
In 2006, the Justice Department requested and received the resignations of nine 
U.S. attorneys.4  The House Committee on the Judiciary began an investigation into 
the replacing of these prosecutors,5 alleging that replacing these prosecutors seemed 
                                                          
 2 United States v. AT&T (AT&T I), 551 F.2d 384, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 3 See Lilley, supra note 1, at 1160-61.  
 4 Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 5 Id. at 55, 57. 
2010] MAKING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE WORK 35 
 
suspicious.6  In doing so, they began seeking documents and testimony from officials 
at the White House, including senior White House staff who communicate directly 
with the President of the United States.7  The White House offered documents 
containing communications between presidential advisers, the Justice Department, 
and also between those advisers and congressional members and staffers.8  Rejecting 
these, the Judiciary Committee made clear that it sought internal White House 
communications involving the President.9  The Committee Chairman John Conyers 
and the relevant Subcommittee Chair Linda Sanchez began a series of demand letters 
to which White House Counsel Fred Fielding, writing for President George W. 
Bush, repeatedly refused to allow senior aides in the White House to testify under 
oath before the Committee.10  Although each side offered various accommodations, 
neither found the other‟s offers acceptable.11  
After the last offer and counteroffer were rejected, the committee subpoenaed 
Miers and Bolten for information regarding replacing the U.S. attorneys in 
question.12  Acting Attorney General (and Solicitor General) Paul Clement, as well 
as the Justice Department‟s Office of Legal Counsel, both advised the President that 
these testimony and documents were protected by executive privilege.13  The 
President then asserted executive privilege, directing Miers and Bolten not to comply 
with the subpoenas.14 
The House Judiciary Committee voted to hold Joshua Bolten and Harriet Miers 
in contempt for refusing to testify, and formally reported the matter to the full House 
for action.15  The full House voted to hold Bolten and Miers in contempt of 
Congress, and authorized the House Judiciary Committee, under Chairman John 
Conyers, to file a civil suit on behalf of the House to seek a federal court to order 
Bolten and Miers to comply with the House subpoena.16  Speaker Nancy Pelosi then 
certified that result pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 194, referring the contempt citation to the 
                                                          
 6 Id. at 57.  During the course of this investigation, over 7,850 pages of information was 
provided to the committee, and a number of administration officials testified.  See id. at 58-59.  
The committee found the testimony of several officials, such as former Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales, to be inconsistent, and investigated further.  Id. at 59.  
 7 Id. at 61-62. 
 8 Id. at 60 (citing Pl.‟s Mot. Ex. 5). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 59-61. 
 11 See id.  
 12 Id. at 61.  On June 13, 2007, the House Judiciary Committee issued subpoenas to White 
House Counsel Harriet Miers to produce documents and offer sworn testimony regarding 
replacing the U.S. attorneys, and to White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten to provide any 
such documents in his possession.  Id.  
 13 Id. at 61-62. 
 14 Id. at 62. 
 15 Id. at 63; H.R. REP. NO. 110-423, at 1 (2007). 
 16 H.R. Res. 979, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. Res. 980, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R. Res. 982, 
110th Cong. (2008).  
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U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia for criminal prosecution.17  Attorney 
General Michael Mukasey replied to Speaker Pelosi that he found the assertion of 
executive privilege proper, and therefore, he would not have the U.S. attorney bring 
prosecutions.18  The House, through Chairman Conyers, then filed suit pursuant to a 
House Resolution passed concurrently with the contempt citations.19  The parties 
then presented the executive privilege in their respective pleadings to the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia,20 where Judge Bates denied the motion to 
dismiss and allowed the suit to move forward on July 31, 2008.21 
Although the question of standing will be addressed in more detail later, the 
district court in Miers found that Congress has standing.22  The Miers court found 
that Congress filed suit to vindicate both its right to information and its right to have 
subpoenas enforced,23 and that either of these grounds satisfies the injury-in-fact 
requirement for standing.24  The district court therefore proceeded to the merits of 
the case, and the D.C. Circuit is likely to do the same both in this case and in 
additional cases should they be brought.  Such holdings carry sufficient promise that 
increased litigation and corresponding assertions of executive privilege are likely 
features of congressional oversight for the foreseeable future.  Therefore, examining 
the meaning and application of executive privilege is timely and helpful.  
Other situations from the previous administration either resulted in, or at least 
contemplated, litigation.  There was an investigation involving former White House 
Senior Adviser Karl Rove, concerning the same circumstances as the Miers/Bolten 
situation, that led to congressional subpoenas and contempt proceedings.25  Another 
situation involved former Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, in which the 
identity of a Central Intelligence Agency employee, Valerie Plame, was made public 
                                                          
 17 Under federal statute, the Speaker of the House certifies a contempt citation to the U.S. 
Attorney for the District of Columbia, “whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the 
grand jury for its action.”  2 U.S.C. § 194 (2006).  
 18 Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, U.S. Att‟y Gen., to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with author).  
 19 H.R. Res. 980, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 20 Mem. of Points & Auths. in Supp. of Pl.‟s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Comm. on the 
Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-00409); Mem. of Points & 
Auths. in Supp. of  Defs.‟ Mot. to Dismiss & in Opp‟n to Pl.‟s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. on 
Counts I & II, Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (No. 1:08-cv-00409).  
 21 Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 108. 
 22 Id. at 78. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id.  
 25 This Senate Judiciary Committee subpoenaed Rove to testify regarding the same U.S. 
attorney situation.  See Paul Kane, Rove, Bolten Found in Contempt of Congress, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 14, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/13/AR2007 
121301736.html.  Once again, President Bush asserted executive privilege, and the committee 
voted to hold Rove in contempt and refer the matter to the full U.S. Senate on December 13, 
2007.  Id.  The House Judiciary Committee later voted to act likewise and referred the matter 
to the full House on July 30, 2008.  Associated Press, Rove could be held in contempt of 
Congress, MSNBC.COM, July 30, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25932226/.  
2010] MAKING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE WORK 37 
 
by a newspaper story discussing pre-war intelligence on Iraq.26  The investigation 
that followed resulted in a criminal conviction,27 though the prison sentenced for that 
conviction was commuted28 and the civil suit arising from these facts was 
dismissed.29  The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, through 
Chairman Henry Waxman sought documents regarding this disclosure,30 
subpoenaing Justice Department records of interviews with President George W. 
Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney discussing the matter.31  Executive privilege 
was asserted regarding those documents, and so Mukasey refused to deliver them to 
the committee.32  The House Judiciary Committee consequently considered holding 
Attorney General Mukasey in contempt of Congress and referring the matter to the 
full House.33 
With these and future situations, one investigative duration should also be noted.  
The House, unlike the Senate, is not a continuous body.34  House subpoenas, 
therefore, expire on January 3 of every odd-numbered year when a new Congress is 
called into session following each congressional election.  Senate subpoenas, by 
contrast, do not expire.  Also, although a President can continue to assert executive 
privilege after he leaves office,35 the vitality of that privilege lessens at that time.36  
The case law does not explain precisely what the limits of that privilege then 
become.  
                                                          
 26 See Robert Novak, Editorial, The Mission to Niger, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 14, 2003, at 
31. 
 27 Chief of Staff to the Vice President Scooter Libby was convicted for, inter alia, perjury 
and obstruction of justice on March 6, 2007.  United States v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 
(D.D.C. 2007).  
 28 Libby‟s prison sentence was commuted by President George W. Bush.  United States v. 
Libby, 495 F. Supp. 2d 49, 51 (D.D.C. 2007).  
 29 Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2008), aff’g 498 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 
2007) (dismissing the case).   
 30 Jason Ryan, Attorney General Threatened with Contempt of Congress over CIA Leak 
Documents, ABCNEWS.COM, July 8, 2008, http://www.abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5 
333956.  
 31 Id. 
 32 Id.  
 33 See 154 CONG. REC. D1134-35 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2008).  All of these incidents were 
also cited in a resolution seeking the impeachment of the former President.  See H.R. Res. 
1258, 110th Cong., art. XXVII (2008).  
 34 AT&T I, 551 F.2d 384, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
 35 See Nixon v. Adm‟r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 449 (1977) (“[Executive] privilege 
survives the individual President‟s tenure.”).  One author argues that executive privilege 
should not outlast a president‟s term.  See Laurent Sacharoff, Former Presidents and 
Executive Privilege, 88 TEX. L. REV. 301, 304 (2009).  
 36 See Sacharoff, supra note 35, at 305. 
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III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALE FOR EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE  
Executive privilege is necessary to the tripartite system of American 
constitutional government.  Both of the political branches—the legislative and the 
executive—are vested with broad powers.37  Having separate, coequal branches, at 
times elected by different parties with different—even incompatible and sometimes 
adverse—agendas inevitably causes clashes between separate actors that nonetheless 
must interface and work together on a daily basis for the federal government to 
function.  But this process can be slow.  “The Separation of Powers often impairs 
efficiency, in terms of dispatch and the immediate functioning of government.  It is 
the long-term staying power of government that is enhanced by the mutual 
accommodation required by the Separation of Powers.”38  Thus, it is expected that 
the two political branches will at times come into conflict, and a way to resolve the 
conflict is needed.  
When such conflicts concern information, executive privilege becomes an issue.  
Both legislative action and executive action require information.  The executive is in 
a superior position to obtain that information, as there is a military and intelligence 
apparatus serving under the President that is essential to dealing effectively with—
and being prepared for—the dangers that any nation faces in an imperfect world.39  
The origins of executive privilege in the United States can be traced to the 
founding of the republic, and has continued to the present day.  President 
Washington made clear in 1792 that he reserved the right to withhold from Congress 
his cabinet deliberations when considering how to respond to the failed efforts of a 
military action led by Major General St. Clair in Ohio.40  Washington then asserted 
executive privilege again in refusing to disclose details regarding the formulation of 
the Jay Treaty.41  Shortly thereafter in Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court 
stated that the cabinet official whose actions were being examined (Secretary of 
State James Madison) did not need to disclose anything confidentially 
communicated to him by the President,42 although the Court went on to find that the 
known facts of the Marbury case were clearly not of a confidential nature.43  Every 
President since Dwight D. Eisenhower has asserted executive privilege to varying 
extents, or at minimum taken efforts to express that he retains the right to assert it.44  
                                                          
 37 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  
 38 United States v. AT&T (AT&T II), 567 F.2d 121, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
 39 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320-21 (1936) 
(dictum).  
 40 Lilley, supra note 1, at 1133 (citing LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE 
PRIVILEGE 10-11 (2004)). 
 41 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320-21 (dictum); see also FISHER, supra note 40, at 35-36.  
 42 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 144-45 (1803) (dictum). 
 43 Id. at 144, 170 (dictum).  At issue in Marbury was the failure of the Secretary of State to 
deliver a signed copy of a D.C. municipal judicial commission to William Marbury.  Id. at 
138-39.  
 44 Lilley, supra note 1, at 1133-34 & nn.13-20 (citing MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE 
PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 39, 41, 54-119, 122, 147-
54 (2d ed. 2002)). 
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“The essential purpose of the separation of powers is to allow for independent 
functioning of each coequal branch of government within its assigned sphere of 
responsibility, free from risk of control, interference, or intimidation by other 
branches.”45 
This does not mean that Congress is powerless to obtain information.  There are 
certainly other tools that Congress can utilize in attempting to motivate the executive 
to divulge information.  The power to withhold confirmations of presidential 
nominations is one of the most obvious examples, but that power is wielded only by 
the Senate.46  The primary tool the House has to encourage executive cooperation is 
the appropriations process.  While one may assume that this power was never 
intended to be used to relentlessly badger or coerce the executive branch, there is 
evidence from the time of the Framing that the power of the purse was always 
intended as a powerful tool in interbranch relations.47  Requesting or demanding 
information is only one option open to Congress as it seeks to fulfill its oversight 
responsibility, and executive privilege is the counterweight to that in our 
constitutional framework. 
A.  Collision of Constitutional Forces Between Coequal Political Branches 
The allocation of powers between separate and coequal branches predictably 
causes challenges.  Congress regularly holds hearings to conduct oversight of 
executive branch agencies.  This oversight consists of probing how the President‟s 
executive power is being exercised in those departments and agencies.  
Congressional hearings are designed to elicit information.  Some of that information 
from the executive is of a nature that the executive seeks to keep confidential, and 
the D.C. Circuit has held that there is a “„great public interest‟” in safeguarding the 
confidentiality of the President‟s conversations concerning his official duties.48  
Thus, executive privilege must accommodate the legitimate needs that both branches 
have regarding information, recognizing “the fundamental constitutional principle 
that „[t]he power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in 
the President.‟”49 
1.  Congressional Oversight 
Much of the confusion over the scope of executive privilege proceeds from the 
ambiguous nature of congressional oversight.  Congressional investigations have 
been part of American government since 1792.50  With the exception of certain 
enumerated quasi-executive functions of the Senate such as confirmations,51 the only 
                                                          
 45 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 760-61 (1982).  
 46 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 47 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison).  
 48 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 729-
30 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). 
 49 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006)).  
 50 Matthew Mantel, Congressional Investigations: A Bibliography, 100 LAW LIBR. J. 323, 
324 n.8 (2008). 
 51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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clear purpose of the legislative branch is to legislate.52  Yet, there is some historical 
support for the argument that Congress has an investigative role beyond its strictly 
legislative function.  George Mason made the comment that members of Congress 
“possess inquisitorial power[] . . . to inspect the Conduct of the public offices”53 
beyond their role as legislators.  And a century later Woodrow Wilson argued that 
“[q]uite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration.”54  The 
Supreme Court resolved this issue when it declared that Congress has a 
constitutional power to conduct oversight of the executive branch,55 as “the power of 
inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the 
legislative function.”56  Otherwise stated: 
[F]or Congress to be able effectively to perform any of its functions—
ranging from legislating, to overseeing administrative agencies, to 
impeaching, to judging the elections, returns, and qualifications of its 
members—it must have access to information.  If those in possession of 
the necessary information could not be made to give it up, then Congress 
would have at its disposal only the information that witnesses wanted it to 
have—hardly an effective means of carrying out its functions.57 
A great deal of oversight hearings are essentially supervisory in nature, rather 
than in contemplation of possible legislation.  Even if the Senate properly has a 
supervisory power incidental to its confirmation power, there is no such justification 
regarding the House.  Although some could argue that Congress has a legitimate role 
in ensuring that legislation is properly implemented,58 there is no explicit textual 
basis in the Constitution for such an argument, and in fact the constitutional text 
speaks against this by charging the President—not Congress—with taking care that 
the laws are properly executed.59  If Congress is overseeing with a watchful eye to 
consider whether remedial legislation is warranted, such a motivation would be 
within the legislative ambit of Article I.  But if a House committee readily 
acknowledges that it is not exploring possible legislation, then, except for the 
appropriations power discussed below, there is no constitutional foundation for such 
hearings absent an inherent interrogatory power.  
                                                          
 52 See id. art. I, § 1.  
 53 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).  
 54 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
297 (The Riverside Press 1901) (1885).  
 55 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).  
 56 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).  
 57 Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1143-
44 (2009) (footnote omitted).  
 58 There are statutes that suggest Congress has such a legally-cognizable interest.  See, 
e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2006) (granting the Senate a right to intervene in litigation “in which 
the powers and responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution of the United States are 
placed in issue”).  This would also explain why, when the Attorney General decides to 
discontinue or refrain from defending the constitutionality of an act of Congress in litigation, 
the Attorney General must inform Congress of that decision.  See 28 U.S.C. § 530D (2006).  
 59 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
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“Congress‟s power to monitor executive actions is implicit in the appropriations 
power.”60  While it is perhaps reasonable that the Appropriations Committee would 
hold hearings on a regular basis to assess the monetary resources it wished to 
allocate to a given agency, it is unclear what role committee hearings play in the 
constitutional process aside from that.  But the question of what information 
Congress is entitled to begs the question of where the constitutional contours of 
oversight lie.  How much is required or suggested by the Constitution, versus what 
has simply become accepted practice over time?  Although longstanding practice is 
not the touchstone of constitutionality,61 the ubiquity of congressional oversight 
since the Framing strongly suggests that it was contemplated as part of the 
constitutional design.  While constitutional silence on oversight (again, beyond the 
implications of appropriations) leaves a great deal of ambiguity, sufficient authority 
exists to form a cogent constitutional doctrine.  
Congressional investigations have an essential role in the tripartite system of 
government to hold the government accountable to the people through its elected 
representatives.  Congress is the “grand inquest of the state.”62  This inquest is held 
in the form of hearings.  The Supreme Court has held that “the constitutional 
provisions which commit the legislative function to the two houses [of Congress] are 
intended to include [oversight inquiries] to the end that the function may be 
effectively exercised.”63  This information-gathering process is necessary because 
“the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate 
auxiliary to the legislative function.”64  Of particular interest in the current situation, 
it should be noted that if Congress finds a person in contempt, it actually has the 
power to order its Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest and physically incarcerate that 
person.65  It has never attempted to utilize that statute to arrest a White House 
official.66  The prospect of doing so has been called “unseemly,”67 which is a bit of 
an understatement, as it may be unconstitutional.68 
The courts have found a constitutional foundation to oversight apart from the 
appropriations process.  Congress‟s subpoena power is partially derived from the 
Speech or Debate Clause.69  The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that in the Eastland 
case the Supreme Court held that the Speech and Debate Clause forbids courts from 
                                                          
 60 AT&T I, 551 F.2d at 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 61 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (finding that a practice maintained 
since the Framing, while evidence of constitutionality, is not dispositive).  
 62 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 415 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). 
 63 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927). 
 64 Id. at 174.  
 65 E.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).  
 66 Resp. to Cong. Requests for Info. Regarding Decisions Made Under the Indep. Counsel 
Act, 10 Op. O.L.C. 68, 86 (1986). 
 67 Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 78 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 68 See id.  
 69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any speech or debate in either House, [Senators and 
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place.”).  
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interfering with congressional subpoenas if those subpoenas concern a legitimate 
area of congressional investigation.70  But the circuit court then reasoned that 
“Eastland immunity is not absolute in the context of a conflicting constitutional 
interest asserted by a coordinate branch of the government,”71 noting that the 
Supreme Court had previously stated in dictum that congressional subpoenas are not 
enforceable if there is a “„need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national 
security secrets.‟”72  The court then qualified that statement, stating that “[a]lthough 
Congress may delegate its investigatory and subpoenaing power to its committees 
and subcommittees, the assertion of this power against an executive claim of 
excessive risk to national security is clearly stronger when ratified by a similar 
plenary vote of the House.”73 
This necessity for investigations includes congressional hearings for the 
Department of Justice and its functionaries.  The Court has stated that 
“administration of the Department of Justice—whether its functions were being 
properly discharged or were being neglected or misdirected . . . [is] one on which 
legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information which 
[Congress‟s] investigation [can provide].”74  Legislation is annually enacted for the 
Justice Department, and therefore, oversight hearings for the Department are not 
only permissible, they are necessary for good government.  
It goes without saying that congressional oversight would be a farce without 
information.  Congress starts at a disadvantage; the executive branch has all of the 
information regarding its operations, and those with the information answer to 
superior executive branch officials in upward lines of authority that eventually end 
with the President.  Every President understands that the less scrutiny administrative 
action receives from a coequal branch, the more freedom the President has to act; 
oversight creates political pressures that constrain the President‟s actions.  
Therefore, Congress‟s subpoena power is essential to oversight.  Thus: 
It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress 
in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action.  It 
is their unremitting obligation to respond to subpoenas, to respect the 
dignity of the Congress and its committees and to testify fully with 
respect to matters within the province of proper investigation.75 
So it was understood long before Watergate that congressional subpoenas are 
sometimes the most effective instrument for Congress to fulfill its oversight duties.  
As the district court in Miers stated, “[s]o long as the Committee is investigating a 
matter on which Congress can ultimately propose and enact legislation, the 
Committee may issue subpoenas in furtherance of its power of inquiry.”76 
                                                          
 70 AT&T I, 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen‟s 
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)). 
 71 Id.  
 72 Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974)). 
 73 Id. at 393 n.16. 
 74 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927). 
 75 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1957). 
 76 Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 77 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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There are of course limits to what Congress can do in seeking to obtain 
information.  Congress cannot violate constitutional principles in seeking testimony 
from witnesses.77  The limits on congressional power to seek information through 
compulsory means must therefore be carefully examined because “a congressional 
committee‟s right to inquire is „subject to‟ all relevant „limitations placed by the 
Constitution on governmental action.‟”78  The Bill of Rights provides some of those 
limits,79 but those are in the context of Congress investigating a private individual,80 
and therefore do not apply to congressional oversight of administration personnel 
regarding their official activities. 
Beyond limits to the procedures and tactics that Congress may employ, there are 
also limits to the proper scope of congressional investigations.  The Supreme Court 
has found that “[a]lthough [Congress‟s] power to investigate is necessarily broad it is 
not unlimited.”81  Article I does not vest Congress with a right to obtain information 
per se, “but rather merely establishes the general power to perform Congress‟s 
legislative function.”82  Conversely, a “generalized interest of presidential 
confidentiality, without more, [does not preclude] discovery of presidential 
conversations in civil litigation.”83  That is to say, the Constitution grants Congress 
only “such limited power of inquiry” to aid in its legislative function.84  Thus, 
inquiries unnecessary for legislative action are not constitutionally founded.85  It 
must be kept in mind that Congress, no different from any governmental entity, can 
succumb to the temptation to exercise power beyond its right to investigate matters 
that lie outside its purview.   
For example, the Senate committee at the heart of the litigation during Watergate 
was expressly created by the Senate to investigate “illegal, improper or unethical 
activities” concerning the 1972 presidential election to determine whether new 
legislation was needed to protect the integrity of the process for future elections.86  
There was thus an explicit legislative goal in the oversight process.  It was not 
simply inquiring.87  
                                                          
 77 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 188. 
 78 Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 610 (1962) (quoting Barenblatt v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959)).  
 79 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161, 164-65 (1955). 
 80 See id. at 157-58. 
 81 Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen‟s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15 (1975). 
 82 Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 67 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 83 Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 242, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
 84 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927). 
 85 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959). 
 86 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d. 725, 726 
& n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting S. Res. 60, 93d Cong. § 1(a) (1973)). 
 87 It would be naïve to suggest, however, that Congress is above using a contemplation-of-
legislation rationale as a pretext to delve into executive affairs.  It is not possible to remove 
politics from political bodies.  
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Those seeking to compel testimony could broadly argue that the Supreme Court 
has stated that the power to compel witnesses is “necessary to the effective 
functioning of [our] courts and legislatures,”88 as the Miers district court noted.89  
But that statement proves too much.  It is a simply a statement of general principle—
an axiom—that being able to get truthful information is, as a general matter, 
essential to our governmental processes.  But the controversies involving executive 
privilege are about how to balance legitimate needs for information with the 
President‟s legitimate need to candidly discuss official matters with those assigned 
to advise him. 
2.  Executive Power of the President  
The executive power of the federal government is vested in the President,90 and 
this provides the counterweight to congressional power that necessitates executive 
privilege.  The concept of inherent executive power is necessarily difficult to define, 
leading many to suggest theories of how courts can fashion rules to evaluate 
assertions predicated on such inherent constitutional authority,91 which is part of the 
foundation of executive privilege.92  Although “[n]owhere in the Constitution . . . is 
there any explicit reference to a[n executive] privilege of confidentiality, yet to the 
extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President‟s powers, it is 
constitutionally based.”93 
This is because of the President‟s need to obtain information and expertise that 
he does not personally possess, a need due to the complexity and variety of national 
policy issues the President must consider.  A modern President must make decisions 
ranging from diplomatic relations with various nations, to military matters, to 
national security threats, to domestic concerns from taxes, to education, to the 
environment, to healthcare.  For all these concerns, the President requires expert 
advice.  “The President . . . must make decisions relying substantially, if not entirely, 
on the information and analysis supplied by advisers.”94 
It necessarily follows that the President‟s ability to confer with his senior 
advisers “is surely an important condition to the exercise of executive power.”95  The 
President must be able to assess the wisdom (or lack thereof) of proposed legislation 
                                                          
 88 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).  
 89 Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 99 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 90 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  
 91 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a 
Framework for Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 887-95 (1983).  
 92 It should be noted, however, that some disagree on whether this executive power is 
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G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE 
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 93 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974).  
 94 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 95 Ass‟n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
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when deciding whether to sign or to veto,96 and for existing law he must take care 
that those laws are faithfully executed.97  If the President must act, and such actions 
necessarily rely on expert advice, then the power to consult is concomitant with the 
power to execute.  
There is a clear analogue with Congress.  The Supreme Court has held that the 
protections members of Congress enjoy regarding their immunity from liability or 
legal process for things said in the course of their official legislative deliberations 
extend to their staffs.98  It must be acknowledged that congressional members have 
the express protection of the Speech and Debate Clause,99 while there is no 
corresponding provision in Article II for the President.  But this does not negatively 
imply that no such protection exists, because Article I enumerates the powers and 
limitations of Congress with great particularity, while Article II sets forth broad 
grants of authority without as much detailed specification.  This is to be expected if 
the Framers shared the view expressed in The Federalist that Congress is the branch 
of the federal government most perilous to freedom,100 in that it becomes all the 
more important to then commit congressional limits to writing.101  And so the lack of 
such a clause in Article II does not imply that the protection for legislators just 
mentioned does not exist for the executive, or for that matter, the courts.  And 
indeed, the courts do enjoy protection very similar to that enjoyed by members of 
Congress.102 
Those seeking broad congressional oversight of the President may quote Justice 
Jackson‟s statements that:  
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can 
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional 
powers of Congress over the matter.  Courts can sustain exclusive 
presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from 
acting upon the subject.103  
It is important, however, not to take Jackson‟s statements too far beyond the facts he 
was considering.  In Youngstown, President Truman had ordered the federal 
government to take control of the nation‟s steel manufacturing facilities and did so 
                                                          
 96 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
 97 Id. art. II, § 3. 
 98 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).  
 99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.  
 100 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (“[I]n a representative republic . . . it is 
against the enterprising ambition of this [branch of government] that the people ought to 
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 102 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
 103 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring).  
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without congressional authorization.104  The Court was dealing with the President 
making national policy of a sort that required legislation, and Justice Jackson was 
arguing that a President can only enact policy unilaterally and against legislative will 
if it is derived directly from his constitutional authority.  Although applicable in 
situations where Congress is passing bills, Youngstown is inapposite when there is 
no promulgation of national policy requiring legislation.  This is about the President 
receiving advice.  Although the Constitution‟s lack of express mention of executive 
privilege suggests that Congress has more latitude in pressing the issue,105 the 
preponderance of case law referencing the constitutional purposes served by 
executive privilege should sufficiently distinguish it from policymaking per se that 
the President has a protected interest in maintaining confidentiality. 
3.  Executive Privilege Is Necessary at the Intersection of Separated Powers  
Thus, the President has an enormous need to receive the most frank and direct 
advice and information possible, which requires some assurance of confidentiality.  
One author (who investigated a President on behalf of Congress) asks, “[D]oes the 
interest in encouraging full and frank communications provide a substantial reason 
for shielding presidential deliberations from outside scrutiny?”106  The Constitution 
answers that question in the affirmative.  “If presidential advisers must assume they 
will be held to account publicly for all approaches that were advanced, considered 
but ultimately rejected, they will almost inevitably be inclined to avoid serious 
considerations of novel or controversial approaches to presidential problems.”107  
The D.C. Circuit has acknowledged that “wholesale public access to Executive 
deliberations and documents would cripple the Executive as a co-equal branch.”108  
The prospect of public disclosure would have a chilling effect on the advice given to 
the President.109  
In a democratic system, there is a cost that attends government secrecy.  
“Maintaining the confidentiality of deliberations . . . erodes public trust and 
confidence in government.  It fuels speculation that government officials have 
something to hide.  And even when officials reach decisions in a manner consistent 
with public ideals and aspirations, it impairs the public‟s ability to confirm that that 
is true.”110  Despite the veracity of that assertion, confidentiality is nonetheless often 
necessary.  If the President is approached through an intermediary with a possibility 
to serve as an interlocutor to open a channel of communication between two nations 
heading toward war, such information is extremely sensitive and disclosing it could 
lead to the loss of many lives.  More central to America‟s national interests, if the 
President is conferring with a top military commander about a covert operation 
                                                          
 104 Id. at 582. 
 105 Cf. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep‟t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-67 (1989). 
 106 Gia B. Lee, The President’s Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 200 (2008). 
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involving U.S. forces in a hostile country, forced disclosure of that conversation 
could cost American troops their lives and possibly plunge the United States into 
war.  It is patently absurd to suggest that the Constitution does not protect the ability 
of the commander-in-chief and diplomatic head of state to engage in protected 
conversations when such issues are implicated.  The Constitution is not a suicide 
pact,111 either for individual Americans or for the republic itself in a dangerous 
world.  
Hence, executive privilege is necessary.  The purpose of executive privilege 
covering presidential communications is to encourage candid discussions: 
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations 
and correspondence . . . [arises from] the necessity for protection of the 
public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in 
Presidential decisionmaking.  A President and those who assist him must 
be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and 
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to 
express except privately.112 
Policy discussions sometimes require blunt assessments of the ramifications for 
proposed courses of action.  Some alternatives have possible consequences that need 
to be explicated in stark terms to ensure that the President appreciates their gravity.  
But in a political world, individual statements can be taken out of context to weaken 
political adversaries, and so presidential advisers (many of whom have political 
ambitions, either regarding higher-level presidential appointments or regarding 
elected office) would be motivated through self-interest to censor their statements or 
reframe them in such a way that they could not be turned against the speaker.  If the 
adviser anticipated that his statements may be publicly divulged, and the adviser 
could not formulate a politically-correct manner in which to phrase the advice, he 
might forego giving it altogether.  
It also goes without saying that there is a correlation between the seriousness of 
the situation being discussed and the downside of certain policy choices; to govern at 
the national level involves making difficult choices.  It follows that in discussing 
such challenging situations absolute candor is needed most.  But it is also true, 
should things go awry, that the more serious a situation in which presidential 
decisions are being made, the more likely it is that Congress will investigate the 
matter.113  This results in a syllogism: the situations that most require frank, candid, 
and perhaps unpopular advice are those in which presidential advisers would be most 
concerned about having to repeat that advice before a watching world during a 
subsequent congressional committee hearing conducted by the opposition political 
                                                          
 111 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  Although 
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party in front of television cameras.  The self-censorship arising from this possibility 
would then bar the President from receiving the best possible advice.  Given the 
gravity of the consequences for the country when such advice is most needed, the 
results of this self-censorship could be disastrous to the national interest.  Executive 
privilege is the only protection against this chilling effect and the consequences it 
would precipitate.  
Perhaps underestimating these considerations, some advocate that Congress 
should always prevail in its attempts to obtain information from the President.  One 
professor makes the odd contention that, “when an executive branch official raises 
executive privilege as a defense justifying her defiance of a congressional subpoena, 
the house of Congress is the proper tribunal to determine whether the invocation of 
executive privilege was appropriate.”114  That contention seems absurd on its face, 
despite its evident support from no one less than Justice Joseph Story,115 as it is not a 
balancing of interbranch interests at all.  What Congress would ever vote that its 
demand for information can be rebuffed?  It simply means that the resolution of 
every contest between the legislature and the executive should expeditiously end in 
the President buckling to Congress.  That is hardly the dynamic one would expect 
from negotiations between truly coequal branches of government.  
The fatal flaw in that argument arises from a faulty model.  The Article at issue is 
based on the British governmental system, analogizing Congress to Parliament.116  
The self-evident problem with that system, however, is that the British government 
is one of parliamentary supremacy.117  It misreads history to construe the original 
constitutional design as empowering Congress to overcome presidential secrecy by 
analogizing to Parliament and the Crown.  Because Parliament was supreme in the 
British system of government, executive power was not completely inherent in the 
monarch.  Rather, executive authority was largely derived from Parliament itself, as 
parliamentary supremacy makes executive power traceable to parliamentary 
authority.  Thus there is no true separation of powers in the parliamentary system, 
without which no effective analogy can be made to the American concept of 
executive privilege.  Indeed, the British Constitution is inferred largely from Acts of 
Parliament.  This system of government stands in sharp contrast with the American 
system, under which the branches of government are established as coequals by a 
written Constitution.118  
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The Constitution requires a degree of statesmanship among all of the federal 
branches to make government work.  
The framers, rather than attempting to define and allocate all 
governmental power in minute detail, relied . . . on the expectation that 
where conflicts in scope of authority arose between the coordinate 
branches, a spirit of dynamic compromise would promote resolution of 
the dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and effective 
functioning of our governmental system.119 
When such statesmanship is employed by both political branches, they should often 
be able to reach a mutually-acceptable arrangement, which is befitting elected 
leaders in a democratic republic.  “Through the normal political process of 
confrontation, compromise, and accommodation, the coordinate branches can 
usually satisfactorily resolve their differences over executive privilege.  We cannot 
solve our modern dilemma by resorting to the solution that was rejected by the 
Framers—that is, by demanding constitutional certitude.”120  
Occasionally, however, the coequal branches of government reach an impasse.  
When the legislative branch desires information that the executive branch does not 
wish to disclose, either they can reach a negotiated accommodation or they cannot.  
If they can reach an agreement, then the courts should abstain from involvement 
regardless of the terms of the political agreement.  When agreement cannot be 
reached, Congress employs compulsory process with which the President refuses to 
comply, and no settlement can be reached, the courts then must arbitrate the impasse 
if properly presented in an Article III case.  At that point there must be rules to 
determine the outcome.  Executive privilege is such a rule.  
B.  The Rationale and Legal Theory for Executive Privilege 
Executive privilege was developed to draw the appropriate lines between 
Congress‟s undisputed need to obtain information necessary for legislative activity 
with the President‟s need for candid advice and safeguarding material of a nature 
that ought not to be public.  Executive privilege is vested in the President by the 
Constitution.121  The D.C. Circuit has noted that “[t]here is constitutional power, 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, in the federal government to keep national 
security information secret.”122  That power extends to other information that must 
be kept confidential.123  
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The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional design.  While the 
legislative branch has 535 members124 and depending how the issue is framed the 
judiciary has either nine (the members of the Supreme Court),125 or almost one 
thousand,126 the executive is only one person.  But the President is distinguished by 
more than the singularity of his office.  He is the chief of state, a national symbol, 
and is the face and voice of the nation.  Americans do not have a monarch as chief of 
state and then a prime minister who is the chief executive, such as in the United 
Kingdom.127  Nor do Americans have both a President and a prime minister, with the 
executive authority governing different policy areas divided between them, as in 
France.128  Instead, all of these roles are combined in one person in the U.S. 
President.129  Aside from the vast powers wielded by the President under Article II, 
he has unique resources, a ready press corps to carry his message (whether the press 
cares for the President or not), and the unique ability to shape the national 
discussion.  The Supreme Court acknowledges that “the singularly unique role under 
Art. II of a President‟s communications and activities, related to the performance of 
duties under that Article,”130 require a correspondingly-circumspect legal status. 
The concept of executive privilege begins with the proposition that a sitting 
President is absolutely immune from testifying to Congress regarding his official 
actions,131 as this would be tantamount to the executive branch answering to the 
legislative branch as one would to a superior.  While that assertion has never been 
                                                          
privilege is a power that the President asserts against the power of Congress in an attempt to 
designate something beyond the power of Congress to discover.  While it is intuitive that 
Congress‟s investigatory power should have its situs in the Necessary and Proper Clause, no 
persuasive structural or case-law argument can be made that the enumerated powers of 
Congress implicitly guarantee converse concomitant rights to the other branches of 
government.  This statement by the D.C. Circuit is likely correct that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is the optimal locus for the governmental power to withhold certain 
information, but that would apply in the context of designating certain information classified 
to render it nonsusceptible to demands for public disclosure by enacting governmental-secrets 
legislation, rather than to permit the executive branch to withhold information from the 
legislative branch.  Executive privilege, by contrast and like any other power wielded by 
President, must be situated in Article II.  
 124 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006). 
 125 It is possible to define the judicial branch as only being nine members in that only the 
Supreme Court must exist.  The Court‟s existence is mandated by the first provision in Article 
III.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.  But that same clause says that Congress may create 
federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court.  
 126 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 44, 133 (2006) (establishing nine seats on the Supreme Court, 179 
circuit judges, and almost 800 district judges, respectively).  
 127 See generally 2 CLAYTON ROBERTS, DAVID ROBERTS & DOUGLAS R. BISSON, A HISTORY 
OF ENGLAND: 1688 TO THE PRESENT (4th ed. 2002). 
 128 See generally MARTIN HARRISON, DE GAULLE TO MITTERRAND: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN 
FRANCE (Jack Hayward ed., 1993). 
 129 See generally GEOFFREY M. HORN, THE PRESIDENCY (2008).  
 130 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974). 
 131 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692 & n.14, 694 n.19 (1997). 
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put to the test, it finds support in the writings of the Framers.132  Assuming arguendo 
that statement is true, to the extent that high-ranking White House officials would be 
advising the President, they effectively become alter egos of the President, just as 
advisers to members of Congress become alter egos of the member,133 and therefore, 
making presidential advisers answerable to Congress would carry the same 
separation-of-powers concerns between the coequal political branches.  
The President extends aspects of his office to those serving under him, in limited 
and diminished ways.  Executive officers answering to the President are participants 
in the President‟s executive power on the President‟s behalf.  This is true in a special 
way for members of the White House staff, who do not occupy offices created by 
Congress in agencies created by Congress.  Members of the White House staff serve 
directly under the President as part of the White House Office.134  Among these 
officials, the senior aides that consult directly with the President are essentially alter 
egos of the President, acting as direct extensions of his office and integral to the 
President‟s deliberations and actions.  
The privilege held by such advisers is a derivative of the protection enjoyed by 
the President himself.  Therefore, to understand the nature and scope of the 
immunity possessed by senior presidential advisers as a result of executive privilege, 
it is necessary to understand how that immunity applies to the President. 
The President holds special legal protection, especially during his term of office. 
Although it has never been put to the test in court, most scholars believe that a sitting 
President cannot be criminally prosecuted while in office.135  There is a strong 
historical and legal foundation for this proposition.  The Great Chief Justice once 
stated that “[i]n no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the 
president as against an ordinary individual.”136  While the President is not “above the 
law,”137 it is nonetheless the case that “special considerations control when the 
Executive Branch‟s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and 
safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications are implicated.”138  This 
protection exists for the good of the nation, not the benefit of the person occupying 
the presidency.  
Although most of this Article focuses on executive privilege regarding top White 
House advisers, it should be noted that the relationship between the President and the 
Attorney General is unique.  Although the Office of the Attorney General and the 
Department of Justice are creations of Congress,139 the Attorney General is a lawyer 
                                                          
 132 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
 133 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615-17 (1972) (“[T]he day-to-day work of such 
aides is so critical to the Members‟ performance that they must be treated as the latter‟s alter 
egos . . . .”).  
 134 See HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-606 GOV, THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 1−8, 24 (2008).  
 135 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 754-55 (3d ed. 2000). 
 136 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) (Marshall, 
C.J., Circuit Justice).  
 137 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974). 
 138 Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 385 (2004).  
 139 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 501, 503 (2006). 
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whose duties include advising the President on legal matters.140  This has the color of 
an attorney-client relationship, and as such has shades of attorney-client privilege.  It 
is a long-held position that conversations between the President and the Attorney 
General are privileged.141  
IV.  CURRENT EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE 
The current state of executive privilege doctrine is a checkerboard of disjointed 
case law.  As a constitutional doctrine, it is governed by case law rather than 
statute.142  The Supreme Court has held that it is within the purview of the judiciary 
to delineate executive privilege.143  The current rule is the balancing test of United 
States v. Nixon and its progeny,144 a case with facts that were unusual enough to 
leave many aspects of executive privilege yet to be decided as questions of first 
impression.  
There are different forms of executive privilege.  The first is the presidential 
communications privilege, which concerns direct communication with the President 
and is rooted in the separation of powers.145  The other is the deliberative process 
privilege announced in In re Sealed Case, which concerns executive 
communications to which the President is not a party but still involves governmental 
deliberations and finds its origin in the common law rather than the separation of 
powers.146  This deliberative process privilege, therefore, extends to senior 
presidential advisers even when the President is not personally involved.147  The 
former is stronger and owed greater deference and protection by the judiciary, which 
is intuitively correct since executive privilege, like all executive power under the 
Constitution,148 finds its locus in the President and radiates from him to subordinate 
functionaries. And the presidential privilege endures in the fact of alleged 
misconduct, while the deliberative privilege does not.149  
                                                          
 140 Id. § 511. 
 141 E.g., Confidentiality of the Att‟y Gen.‟s Commc‟ns in Counseling the President, 6 Op. 
O.L.C. 481 (1982). 
 142 Some consider it possible for Congress to calibrate the scope of executive privilege.  
E.g., William Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 
22 UCLA L. REV. 116, 118-19 (1974).  But assuming arguendo that such strictures would be 
constitutional, they would still have to be passed by Congress in accordance with the 
Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses, not implied by a single-chamber resolution from the 
congressional chamber seeking enforcement of a committee subpoena.  Given the importance 
of executive privilege, it is difficult to imagine circumstances where any President would sign 
such a bill into law. 
 143 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974). 
 144 Id.  
 145 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 146 Id. (citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 & n.35 (1982)). 
 147 Ass‟n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 
see also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 749-50. 
 148 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745-46.  
 149 Id. at 746. 
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In announcing the deliberative privilege in In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit 
broadened executive privilege to a scope beyond the Supreme Court‟s holding in 
Nixon.150  The case concerned documents sought in an Independent Counsel 
investigation of Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy, where the White House asserted 
privilege.151  The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the White House on 84 demanded 
documents.152  This became the first case in which a court denied Congress 
disclosure by applying executive privilege to cover information with which the 
President was not personally involved or aware.  
A.  Contextual Observations 
Although not explored in this Article, there are two issues that should be noted 
before examining current executive privilege doctrine and how it could be improved.  
First, the composition of executive-privilege case law is unusual.  There are few 
Supreme Court cases; most cases are from the federal circuit or district court situated 
in the District of Columbia.  This composition is partly due to the political calendar, 
as the relatively-short windows between presidential and congressional elections 
often result in executive privilege cases becoming moot or otherwise nonjusticiable.  
Another reason is geographical.  With few exceptions,153 most executive privilege 
cases are filed in Washington, D.C.  Therefore, D.C. Circuit and D.C. District 
precedents supply most of the controlling authority on executive privilege cases.  
This resulting case law should be noted because several executive privilege rules 
would be questions of first impression if the cases noted here go up on appeal, and 
thus, the governing law could change substantially with relatively little adjudication.  
Second, this Article does not explore various threshold issues that must be 
addressed before reaching the merits of these cases.  The D.C. Circuit held that cases 
with fact patterns such as the ones discussed herein are justiciable.154  Conflicts 
between the legislative and executive branches over congressional subpoenas can be 
litigated,155 including executive privilege assertions.156  But as a jurisdictional 
threshold to such adjudication,157 the plaintiffs must establish standing,158 requiring 
                                                          
 150 Nelson Lund & Douglas R. Cox, Executive Power and Governmental Attorney-Client 
Privilege: The Clinton Legacy, 17 J.L. & POL. 631, 651-52 (2001) (discussing In re Sealed 
Case, 121 F.3d 729). 
 151 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 734.  
 152 Id. 
 153 E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(concerning information sought by a grand jury in connection with the Independent Counsel 
investigation into President Clinton).  
 154 AT&T I, 551 F.2d 384, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing Senate Select Comm. on 
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
 155 AT&T II, 567 F.2d 121, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
 156 E.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 
51 (D.D.C. 1973).  
 157 Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env‟t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998)). 
 158 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006).  
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“an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to 
the defendant‟s challenged behavior; and likely to be redressed by a favorable 
ruling.”159  The Supreme Court has cautioned that where separation of powers is 
involved, as with executive privilege, consideration of standing must be “especially 
rigorous,”160 because “the case-or-controversy limitation is crucial to maintaining the 
„tripartite allocation of power‟ set forth in the Constitution.”161  Although the D.C. 
Circuit had held that the House has standing to assert its investigatory power,162 
subsequent Supreme Court opinions introduce doubt as to whether there might be 
substantial limitations to when Congress has standing to pursue executive privilege 
cases in court.163  And there are other threshold issues as well, such as whether the 
House has a cause of action.164  While these issues are beyond the scope of this 
Article, they should be noted and must be explored when adjudicating executive 
privilege cases, as they create significant obstacles to litigation.  
B.  The United States v. Nixon Balancing Test and Modern Procedure  
Two 1974 cases create the framework for executive privilege claims.  The D.C. 
Circuit considered an executive privilege claim against the U.S. Senate, and the 
Supreme Court faced a claim against a court subpoena in a criminal investigation.  
These cases were the first concerning executive privilege at the presidential level, 
and both adopted Chief Justice Marshall‟s contention from an early trial court 
decision that the federal judiciary has the power to determine the propriety and 
enforceability of subpoenas against the President.165  
1.  What Is Protected by the Current Rule 
The D.C. Circuit case was Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activites v. Nixon,166 the second round of litigation previously styled Nixon v. 
Sirica.167  At issue was President Nixon‟s refusal to turn over to the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities audio tapes of his conversations 
                                                          
 159 Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 733 (2008) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). 
 160 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997).  
 161 Cuno, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for 
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982)).  
 162 AT&T I, 551 F.2d at 391.  
 163 Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting Raines, 521 U.S. at 
829). 
 164 Mem. of Points and Auths. in Supp. of Defs.‟ Mot. to Dismiss & in Opp‟n to Pl.‟s Mot. 
for Partial Summ. J. on Counts I and II, supra note 20, at 38-39 (citing Stoneridge Inv. 
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 
(2001)).  
 165 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692) (Marshall, C.J., 
Circuit Justice).  
 166 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974).  
 167 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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with White House Counsel John Dean.168  This was the first time Congress attempted 
to compel divulging such information.169  The D.C. Circuit held that the President 
holds a presumptive privilege against congressional inquiries, rather than an absolute 
privilege,170 a view later ratified by the Supreme Court.171  
The Supreme Court took up the question of an executive privilege claim for the 
first time in United States v. Nixon.172  The trial court and President Nixon had 
reached an impasse when, following his being named an unindicted coconspirator,173 
the court subpoenaed audio tapes held by President Nixon and Nixon asserted 
executive privilege.174  Rejecting Nixon‟s argument that the President holds an 
absolute privilege,175 the Court stated that “neither the doctrine of separation of 
powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without 
more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from 
[investigative] process under all circumstances.”176  In its analysis, the Court 
announced a balancing test which still controls executive privilege cases.  A court 
“must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served against the 
dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch,”177 
balancing the public interest served by protecting the President‟s confidentiality 
against the public interest served by disclosure.178  
Foreign matters are subject to a higher level of protection than domestic.  Aside 
from national security or foreign policy, executive privilege can be defeated by “an 
adequate showing of need.”179  For congressional subpoenas, the question is 
“whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative 
function.”180  For example, in AT&T I the D.C. Circuit weighed Congress‟s need for 
the information sought against the risk to national security.181  The D.C. Circuit has 
noted that the executive branch is entitled to greater deference where foreign policy 
is concerned,182 and that the Supreme Court has said in dictum that its holdings thus 
                                                          
 168 Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d. at 726. 
 169 Id. at 733.  
 170 Id. at 729-31.  
 171 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). 
 172 Id. at 686-709. 
 173 Id. at 686. 
 174 Id.  
 175 Id. at 703.  
 176 Id. at 706. 
 177 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982).  
 178 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 179 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 180 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732 
(D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 181 AT&T I, 551 F.2d 384, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 182 Id. at 392 (citing Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 
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far on executive privilege are not intended to control questions concerning military, 
diplomatic, or national security matters.183   
In AT&T I, a House subcommittee subpoenaed documents regarding warrantless 
wiretaps that AT&T had facilitated for the FBI.184  Negotiations with the White 
House failed, at which point President Ford asserted that AT&T was acting as a 
government agent and accordingly instructed AT&T not to comply with the 
subpoena.185  When AT&T refused to obey President Ford, believing it was legally 
bound to honor the subpoena,186 the Justice Department sought to enjoin 
compliance,187 resulting in a district court order favoring the White House.188  The 
D.C. Circuit found that the case was properly understood as an interbranch dispute 
between Congress and the White House,189 so the case turned on the reach of 
executive privilege.  These wiretaps were for national security,190 so the court‟s 
upholding of executive privilege, given the tenuous nature of the President‟s claim 
that AT&T was a government instrumentality, illustrates the extraordinary protection 
the privilege affords in national security contexts.  
Military secrets are always protected by a close cousin of the national-security 
executive privilege, the state secrets privilege.191  One case, United States v. 
Reynolds, involved family of deceased Air Force personnel seeking information 
regarding their deaths in a military plane crash.192  The Supreme Court upheld the 
military‟s refusal to release the information, holding that “even the most compelling 
necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied 
that military secrets are at stake.”193 
The D.C. Circuit has also held that the Supreme Court precedents governing 
executive privilege in criminal proceedings apply to civil proceedings as well,194 
though the Supreme Court has not had occasion to accept or reject that conclusion.  
There are two prongs to the executive privilege test in a criminal case: (1) the 
                                                          
 183 Id. at 391 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974)).  Although some 
were concerned that this language regarding almost insurmountable privilege for national 
security information would invite Presidents to abuse the special national security protections, 
e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 142, at 117-18, subsequent years have not justified that concern. 
 184 AT&T I, 551 F.2d at 385.  
 185 Id. at 387. 
 186 Id.  
 187 Id.  
 188 Id. at 387-88. 
 189 Id. at 389. 
 190 Id. at 385.  
 191 See, e.g., Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57-59 
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also STEPHEN DYCUS 
ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1037-55 (4th ed. 2007).  
 192 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1953). 
 193 Id. at 11. 
 194 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 743-45 (D.C. Cir 1997); Dellums v. Powell, 561 F.2d 
242, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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subpoenaed materials must likely contain important evidence, and (2) that evidence 
cannot otherwise be discovered by due diligence.195  Although executive privilege 
has been extended to civil matters, it is an open question whether this rule in 
criminal cases is also the rule in civil suits.  
The D.C. Circuit has also outlined the procedure for executive privilege.  The 
privilege may be invoked if information required from the executive involves 
presidential decision making or deliberation.196  Only the President can assert the 
privilege.197  The material is presumptively privileged, a presumption that can be 
overcome by an adequate showing of need,198 after which the court conducts an in 
camera examination of the material, excising from the documents material it finds 
privileged.199  For the material that passes initial review, the President must be given 
an opportunity before disclosure to present more particularized claims to justify 
withholding those items,200 and the court then releases the material if those 
supplemental claims are rejected.201  While the in camera inspection is conducted to 
determine whether executive privilege applies,202 the inspection itself only occurs 
after the party seeking disclosure makes a showing of need.203  Until such a showing 
has been made, the White House need not submit subpoenaed information even to 
the courts for inspection.204 
The D.C. Circuit considers executive privilege analogous to attorney-client 
privilege, stating: 
[No authority] explain[s] why legal advice should be on a higher plane 
than advice about policy, or politics, or why a President‟s conversation 
with the most junior lawyer in the White House Counsel‟s Office is 
deserving of more protection from disclosure . . . than a President‟s 
discussions with his Vice President or a Cabinet Secretary.  In short, we 
do not believe that lawyers are more important to the operations of 
government than all other officials, or that the advice lawyers render is 
more crucial to the functioning of the Presidency than the advice coming 
from all other quarters.205 
The court here states there is no rationale why attorneys in government should enjoy 
a stronger privilege than presidential deliberations.  But the converse is the important 
                                                          
 195 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 754. 
 196 Id. at 744. 
 197 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 135, at 776 n.40. 
 198 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 744-45. 
 199 Id. at 745. 
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 202 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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point: the D.C. Circuit accords presidential communications the same confidentiality 
protection as applies in an attorney-client relationship.  If cabinet secretaries, holding 
offices created by acts of Congress and only after being independently confirmed by 
the Senate, enjoy such protection, then it follows a fortiori that senior White House 
advisers, part of the Office of the President who never must be submitted to 
Congress for its approval, should enjoy that level of protection.  
Subpoenas also cannot overcome executive privilege if the authority issuing 
them is engaged in “a general fishing expedition.”206  The Court suggests that 
congressional investigations cannot attempt to “expose for the sake of exposure.”207  
This suggests a subpoena would be illegitimate if there was no bona fide legislative 
purpose (which is to say, likely just a political ploy).  If so, that suggests courts can 
inquire into the purpose of a given subpoena, and possibly find it unenforceable.208  
Congress also cannot defeat executive privilege if those pursuing the information 
“seek in any way to investigate the wisdom of the President‟s discharge of his 
discretionary duties.”209  The Court invalidated a congressional investigation in 1881 
as being “clearly judicial” because it lacked a legislative purpose,210 establishing 
“that Congress must have a valid legislative purpose for conducting an investigation 
and for exercising the power of compulsory process.”211   
The privilege is designed to err on the side of protecting executive 
confidentiality.  The D.C. Circuit held Senate subpoenas investigating possible 
illegalities during the 1972 election insufficient to overcome executive privilege,212 
even though investigating illegalities was the reason the committee was created.213  
Consistent with that approach, the Supreme Court has more recently determined that 
the White House does not need to “invoke[e] executive privilege with sufficient 
specificity and . . . particularized objections” as such detailed accounting would 
impose an administrative hardship.214  The privilege therefore acts to prevent 
annoying or harassing procedures that could distract the President or impair 
executive officials fulfilling their duties.  
Although this Article focuses on presidential privilege, it is also quite likely that 
some future controversies will center on deliberative process privilege if some of the 
                                                          
 206 Sirica, 487 F.2d at 717.  
 207 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957). 
 208 Case law is silent as to how deferential courts should be in making this inquiry.  Must 
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sought-after information did not personally involve the President.  This lesser 
deliberative privilege applies to 
communications authored or solicited and received by those members of 
an immediate White House adviser‟s staff who have broad and significant 
responsibility for investigating and formulating the advice to be given the 
President on the particular matter to which the communications relate.  
Only communications at that level are close enough to the President to be 
revelatory of his deliberations or to pose a risk to the candor of his 
advisers.215 
By cautioning that “presidential communications privilege should never serve as a 
means of shielding information regarding governmental operations that do not call 
ultimately for direct decisionmaking by the President,”216 the D.C. Circuit extended 
that privilege by negative inference to include anything that may ultimately require a 
presidential decision.217  This could be broadly construed to cover a great deal of 
information, so likely additional judicial consideration will be necessary to trace the 
limits of that extension.  
2.  What Is (or May Be) Unprotected Under This Rule 
Although there may be some aspects of criminal investigations where executive 
privilege could be used, it does not completely protect any individual.  The Supreme 
Court found that “[t]he impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would 
place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do 
justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts 
under Art. III.”218  The Court held that allowing executive privilege to thwart “a 
subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes . . . would upset the 
constitutional balance of „a workable government‟ and gravely impair the role of the 
courts under Art. III,”219 and it explained at length how allowing executive privilege 
to scuttle bona fide criminal investigations would undermine confidence in the 
criminal justice system.220 
Executive privilege involving the President is limited to presidential 
communications relating to his responsibilities, affairs of office, public policy, and 
presidential decisions.221  It does not apply to actions he committed before becoming 
President,222 though district courts possess the power to delay pending litigation 
during the President‟s term.223  Similarly, although “Presidential privilege clearly 
must yield to the important congressional purposes of preserving the materials and 
                                                          
 215 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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maintaining access to them for lawful governmental and historical purposes,”224 a 
court could delay their disclosure during the President‟s tenure in office.  
The D.C. Circuit has reasoned that although fact-finding of past events is part of 
the legislative process, such information is less important than in court proceedings 
because legislating focuses more on anticipating policy consequences than precisely 
reconstructing past events.225  While no executive privilege rule has been 
propounded from this reasoning, it suggests that there are situations where executive 
privilege would not prevail if a court finds that the sought-after information is 
essential in a courtroom setting because reconstructing facts would be essential to 
litigation, but falling short if intended for a congressional committee setting in which 
those facts would be nonessential.  
C.  Unanswered Questions Regarding Enumerated Powers such as Appointment 
Power 
The case law therefore leaves a great many questions unanswered regarding 
executive privilege, again owing to the fact that executive privilege claims are rarely 
litigated.  Such questions include:  
[W]ho can assert executive privilege, the extent to which a sitting 
President can override the executive privilege claim of a former President, 
the length of the period of secrecy justified by a President‟s need for 
candid advice, and whether a President can compel the silence of 
subordinates by invoking executive privilege.226  
This underdevelopment of executive privilege doctrine makes the privilege 
problematic as a legal matter, with broad areas of uncertainty on this constitutional 
doctrine. 
The Supreme Court provides a guidepost for such questions.  The principle 
underlying executive privilege, which must guide its development and application, is 
“that the District Court has a very heavy responsibility to see to it that Presidential 
conversations, which are either not relevant or not admissible, are accorded that high 
degree of respect due the President of the United States.”227  Although it is common 
for Presidents of both parties to be targets of unfavorable editorials and even humor, 
the law must be mindful that “[t]he President‟s unique status under the Constitution 
distinguishes him from other executive officials,”228 and thus, judicial actions 
directed at the President must treat him in a manner consistent with respect befitting 
the dignity of his office. 
1.  Exploring Unresolved Questions 
One question often overlooked or disregarded sub silentio is how the contours of 
executive privilege should differ based on the setting in which it is asserted.  Many 
                                                          
 224 Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 454.  
 225 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732 
(D.C. Cir. 1974).  
 226 Lilley, supra note 1, at 1135.  
 227 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-15 (1974).  
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of the principal cases creating the case law governing executive privilege were 
courtroom cases,229 and casebooks often discuss executive privilege in a courtroom 
setting alongside other evidentiary privileges.230  In such cases there is Congress (or 
some other party) proffering its strongest argument in an adversarial fashion against 
the White House, which in turn rebuts with its strongest argument, with a federal 
judge sitting as a neutral arbiter to weigh the competing interests and rule on the 
assertion of privilege.  By contrast, there is no neutral arbiter in a congressional 
hearing.  The hearing is presided over by the chairman, who rules on questions or 
assertions of either the witnesses before him (here, perhaps a senior White House 
adviser) or of other members of the committee.231  But the chairman is the only 
person with the authority to issue the subpoena seeking the testimony in the first 
place.232  The chairman is not neutral; he is either a politician of the President‟s 
party, or he is a politician of the opposition party.  Therefore, it is a foregone 
conclusion which way the chairman will rule on an assertion of any privilege to 
thwart his subpoena.  
The Supreme Court‟s ruling that executive privilege cannot defeat a subpoena in 
criminal proceedings will not apply to many assertions of executive privilege both 
because there is usually no criminal statute involved (excepting of course the fact 
that contempt of Congress can have criminal penalties) and also because 
congressional oversight hearings are not adversarial proceedings before a neutral 
presiding officer, as is the case in a criminal prosecution.  By the Court‟s own words, 
United States v. Nixon clearly does not cover situations such as these, because there 
the Court limited its opinion by saying that in that case it was not “concerned with 
the balance between the President‟s generalized interest in confidentiality and the 
need for relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that between the [President‟s] 
confidentiality interest and congressional demands for information.”233  This creates 
additional uncertainty regarding civil suits, as the Nixon Court expressly limited its 
holding to criminal investigations.234  Though the logic of that case easily extends to 
many civil matters, the Court‟s own opinion limits its precedential effect to criminal 
suits, leaving its civil application an open question.  
A final question is the difference of the privilege‟s scope in courtroom 
proceedings versus congressional proceedings.  Aside from the distinctions already 
noted, the D.C. Circuit set forth a predicate for differentiating the two referenced 
above, saying that Congress‟s “legislative judgments normally depend more on the 
predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political 
                                                          
 229 E.g., In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that “the 
presidential communications privilege could be overcome by the evidentiary demands of a 
civil trial”).  
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14 (2003).  
 232 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-423, at 33 (2007). 
 233 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 n.19 (1974).  
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acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events.”235  Where a court is able 
to separate cases when such reconstruction is required, it is possible to fashion 
different legal rules.  
2.  Presidential Appointment Power 
In recent investigations, the Chairmen of the House Judiciary Committee and 
Senate Judiciary Committee specified that they desired copies of internal White 
House documents regarding replacing political-appointee prosecutors.236  That 
directly implicates presidential power under the Appointments Clause.  
The Constitution gives general appointment power to the President.  The 
President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not 
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”237  Although 
Congress can grant appointment power to department heads or the courts,238 
Congress can never wield such power itself.239  And although the Senate has a role in 
the appointment process of principal officers,240 the House has no role whatsoever.  
This Appointments Clause issue has major implications both for one recent 
controversy and also for a controversy that may now be looming.  As mentioned 
above, through the end of the Bush administration, the ongoing legal controversy 
involved U.S. attorneys.  And with the change in control of the House that occurred 
in November 2010, it is quite possible that the federal courts will delve into the 
uncharted constitutional waters of congressional oversight of White House “czars.”  
All this comes in the context of a major Appointments Clause case in the Supreme 
Court, decided just last term.241 
Current federal law clearly states that U.S. attorneys are appointed by the 
President of the United States, subject to Senate confirmation.242  Although this 
appointment is for a four-year term,243 that same statute clearly states that the 
President can remove them at any time, and does not require any cause to do so,244 
echoing the Supreme Court‟s determination that “[t]he power of removal is incident 
                                                          
 235 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732 
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to the power of appointment.”245  Although some could argue that Congress has a 
constitutional role to play in overseeing performance, the Court has held that 
Congress cannot direct the course of law enforcement by controlling who will 
enforce the law.246  That being so, it is difficult to understand what legislative role 
Congress is fulfilling by investigating the conversations surrounding the President 
replacing one politically-appointed law enforcement officer with another.  When 
various agencies engage in policymaking under authority delegated by Congress 
there is perhaps an argument to be made that Congress can oversee the agency‟s use 
of this delegated authority that carries a legislative character by its enacting of 
policy.  But that should not apply where, as here, the questions concern federal 
prosecutors, because law enforcement is a purely executive function.  Even if it 
intends to add some form of “for cause” clause to the appointing statute for U.S. 
attorneys, it still would not be necessary to know whether any such cause existed for 
those prosecutors replaced under the law as it is currently written.  
The Court struck down part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
because some members of the governing body were appointed by Congress.247  In 
doing so it made clear that the Constitution is inflexible in prohibiting those who 
make the laws from enforcing or administering those laws.248  “The core concern of 
[the Appointments Clause] . . . is to ensure that federal executive power remains 
structurally independent of Congress and of the congressional power base.”249 
The necessity of the President being able to remove political appointees who 
serve at his pleasure at any time and for any reason seems self-evident in reading 
Article II.  The President alone is responsible to seeing that laws are faithfully 
executed.250  
The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a 
grant of the power to execute the laws.  But the President alone and 
unaided could not execute the laws.  He must execute them by the 
assistance of subordinates. . . .  As he is charged specifically to take care 
that they be faithfully executed, the reasonable implication, even in the 
absence of express words, was that as part of his executive power he 
should select those who were to act for him under his direction in the 
execution of the laws.251  
The President is the commander-in-chief of American military forces and chief 
executive of the nation‟s administration, and therefore, he is vested with the 
executive authority of the government to carry out those tasks.  The President‟s 
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power to remove appointees was recognized and exercised as such throughout the 
entirety of the American presidency.252 
This history also holds specific guidance regarding the current controversies.  
There is actually one historical precedent on point to this Article.  Only once before 
has Congress demanded executive records regarding the removal of U.S. attorneys.  
The Senate requested Justice Department records to that effect from President 
Grover Cleveland, who categorically refused253 because appointing U.S. attorneys “is 
vested in the President alone by the Constitution.”254  It should be noted that the 
request there was for documents held by the Justice Department, which is a statutory 
creation of Congress,255 under an Attorney General who is confirmed by the 
Senate.256  In Miers, the request was for direct presidential communications held by 
the White House itself, concerning the private deliberations of the President.  
Although the courts never had occasion to consider the Cleveland incident, the 
Senate‟s decision not to pursue the matter further is instructive.  If it was acceptable 
to refuse such a congressional inquiry when it involved the Justice Department, then 
a fortiori it should be all the more acceptable when the question concerns only the 
White House.  
Regarding U.S. attorneys, the Supreme Court stated in Berger v. United States: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, 
but that justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar and very 
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt 
shall not escape or innocence suffer.  He may prosecute with earnestness 
and vigor—indeed, he should do so.  But, while he may strike hard blows, 
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.257 
One of the fired U.S. attorneys made this point in writing against the 
administration.258  But this statement proves far too much if it is used to imply that 
there can be no political factors in appointing U.S. attorneys.  The usual practice is 
that U.S. attorneys are recommended by home-state U.S. senators (holders of 
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political office),259 with the decision then made by the President and reviewed by the 
Senate (also holders of political office).  Taking the above statement to support that 
implication would result in U.S. attorneys needing to be civil service employees, 
career government workers chosen through a merit-based hiring mechanism.260  The 
idea that it is even possible for a person whose hiring comes from a U.S. Senator 
recommending someone to the U.S. President and then facing a vote from the U.S. 
Senate to obtain the position in question without any political considerations is 
simply preposterous, and would therefore be a plain misreading of Berger. 
Appointments are among a President‟s most consequential acts.  The courts have 
expressly been mindful of the unitary nature of the executive in matters of executive 
privilege, with the D.C. Circuit admonishing that “[t]he Constitution after all vests 
the executive power not in the executive branch, but in the President,”261 and the 
Supreme Court likewise cautioning that the President is “the chief constitutional 
officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy 
responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity.”262  Some could argue that the 
Court has perhaps at times undervalued that distinction recently,263 and so it 
behooves the judiciary to appreciate that distinction in defining executive privilege.   
However, White House “czars” are an entirely different matter as far as the 
Constitution is concerned.  “In light of „[t]he impossibility that one man should be 
able to perform all the great business of the State,‟ the Constitution provides for 
executive officers to „assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his 
trust.‟”264  That mechanism requires Congress to create the various executive offices 
in which these subordinate officers assist the President.  As explained in more detail 
below, one element of the separation of powers is that only Congress can create such 
offices.  While the President is welcome to have whomsoever he wishes as a White 
House adviser, to suggest or examine specific subjects or topics at the President‟s 
request, such a person has no executive authority to make any government action 
unless that person is an officer of the United States.  Although principal officers 
must be confirmed by the U.S. Senate before exercising any authority, even inferior 
officers can only hold offices that Congress deigns to create.  
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D.  The Courts Should Adopt a Multi-Factor Test for Interbranch Executive 
Privilege Cases 
The executive privilege balancing test lends itself to a multi-factor analysis, 
rather than individual and discrete per se rules derived from specific cases.  The key 
to executive privilege claims between the President and Congress is finding the 
common border of their constitutional roles.  This analysis applies the information 
already considered in this Article to construct a judicially-manageable framework for 
executive privilege.  
The President has a constitutional duty to perform, consisting of executing and 
administering the laws, formulating foreign and national-security policy, 
commanding the U.S. military, and nominating individuals to various executive and 
judicial offices.  The President must constantly determine which individuals best suit 
his needs in fulfilling his duties, and therefore, he is constantly appointing and 
removing subordinates from various offices created by Congress.  That role is 
independent of Congress, and in it, the President requires information and expert 
advice, some of which must be kept confidential for the President to perform his 
duty well.  Other information, such as that pertaining to military secrets, intelligence, 
or sensitive diplomacy, requires even more confidentiality.  
Congress also has a constitutional duty to perform, legislating.  This duty 
includes annual legislation for appropriations and authorizations, which entails 
appropriating and authorizing executive departments created by Congress.  Further, 
these departments are led by officers confirmed by Congress, holding offices created 
by Congress, and enacting policy under authority delegated by Congress.  Therefore, 
Congress requires information regarding the performance of those individuals and 
agencies, both to inform its annual monetary and authorizing renewals of those 
entities, and also to keep a watchful eye as to whether new legislation is necessary, 
prudent, or beneficial.  
Thus, both of these constitutional branches have a need for information, and 
those informational needs are sometimes in tension or even conflict.  There are 
discernable lines between what is properly within congressional purview versus what 
properly belongs within presidential purview.265  But that line is not uniformly 
situated in all executive privilege assertions during interbranch disputes over 
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information.  There are several factors that shift the line toward executive 
confidentiality or toward legislative oversight, depending on the actors involved and 
the government action at issue. 
This suggests that the courts should employ a multi-factor analysis in executive 
privilege cases.266  There are at least seven discernable factors (not including 
subfactors) that counsel either for or against executive privilege in a given situation, 
and courts may discover others as they apply this framework.  Employing this 
framework would facilitate a consistent and logical resolution of executive privilege 
cases.  This, in turn, would inform both political branches of what is and is not 
protected over time as a court applies the framework to different cases, which should 
increasingly help obviate future litigation between the elected branches.  
1.  Office Created by Congress  
The first factor is whether the information sought is held by an agency created by 
Congress.  As previously mentioned, Congress has an oversight role largely as an 
incident to its appropriating function.  To the extent that Congress has an oversight 
role beyond appropriating,267 it can assert a responsibility to monitor the 
effectiveness of legislation it has passed.  A logical extension of that reasoning is 
that if an agency is a creation of Congress, then Congress can claim a duty to gather 
such information as is necessary to determine whether that agency is functioning 
properly.  For example, the Department of Agriculture is a creation of Congress, and 
so Congress could cite a responsibility to assess whether the department is properly 
fulfilling Congress‟s intended purpose for the department.  To the extent that this 
factor is present, it weighs in favor of disclosing information to Congress.  
2.  Policymaking  
The second factor is whether the information pertains to policymaking. 
Legislation is the codification of public policy.  It is appropriate to say that 
policymaking is often—if not always—legislative in nature, whether it is being 
performed by the legislature or some other branch.  Administrative actions such as 
rulemaking and promulgating regulations are often policymaking actions.  To the 
extent that executive actors are policymaking, they are engaged in an action that is 
arguably legislative.  To the extent that the action is legislative, it is partaking in the 
legislative function.268  Congress, as the legislative branch, can rightfully assert that 
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policymaking actions fall under its jurisdiction, because such actions are performed 
under Congress‟s statutory delegation of authority.269  For example, the 
Environmental Protection Agency‟s (EPA) determinations regarding what level of 
arsenic is safe for drinking water would be a policy judgment that could be enacted 
with legislation, and Congress could inquire into the reasoning that went into 
formulating that standard.270  Therefore, Congress can claim a right to information 
regarding this policymaking, under the theory that because Congress delegated the 
power being exercised, the delegating authority has a right to monitor its use to 
determine whether that delegation should be rescinded or modified.  This factor 
weighs in favor of disclosure to Congress.  
As a subfactor of this second factor, if the information does concern 
policymaking, then the nature of the policy is important.  The executive branch has 
primary, and thus, enhanced authority regarding foreign policy.  Foreign policy can 
also be more sensitive in nature, requiring greater confidentiality, and more directly 
impact diplomatic, military, and national security concerns, which the Court has 
acknowledged to be the apex of presidential strength in executive privilege 
disputes.271  Therefore, Defense Department rules and regulations that impact the 
capabilities of U.S. troops stationed overseas should be more protected than 
Agriculture Department rules and regulations for meat inspections.  
3.  Extra-White House Origins  
The third factor is if the information is held by an agency that is part of the White 
House, whether it is a statutory creation that was ever independent of the White 
House.  The Executive Office of the President does not just include the White House 
Office; it includes a variety of offices.  Some of these were formerly independent 
agencies that were subsumed into the Executive Office of the President, bringing it 
under the aegis of the President.272  For example, the Office of Management and 
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Budget was formerly the Bureau of the Budget, a part of the Treasury Department 
created in 1921.273  President Franklin Roosevelt brought it under his more direct 
control by making it an office within the White House in 1939.274  It, therefore, still 
carries an element of statutory creation even though it is now to some degree part of 
the White House.  Such a factor counsels against executive privilege and in favor of 
disclosure. 
4.  Textual Commitment in the Constitution  
The fourth factor is whether there is a textual commitment of the underlying 
subject or individual in the Constitution.  Textual commitments are strong indicia of 
which branch of government should have primacy for any given government action 
or policy area.  If the matter in question is referenced in Article II, such as military 
matters implicated by the Commander-in-Chief Clause,275 this counsels in favor of 
confidentiality.  This is consonant with executive privilege being possibly 
undefeatable where national security is concerned, and also finds support in the fact 
that the related state-secrets privilege is insurmountable.276  If the subject at issue in a 
given case involves Article I matters, such as expenditures implicating the 
Appropriations Clause277 or regulation of interstate commerce,278 then it counsels in 
favor of disclosure to Congress.   
The most significant of the textual commitments favoring Congress is if 
Congress is contemplating the impeachment or removal of the President.  There is a 
certain presumption of good faith when the President is in his normal standing with 
the nation.  Even a President wracked by scandal is still the President and cannot be 
made to endure undue interference, as the nation would suffer if the President were 
impaired from the performance of his duties.  But the House retains the power of 
impeachment279 and the Senate the power of removal,280 and if those bodies formally 
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embark upon that course, then the presumption of good faith and deference to the 
President is lessened.  He is under a political indictment of constitutional 
proportions.  Thus, if the House or Senate is engaged in impeachment or removal 
proceedings, then this setting would be a factor in Congress‟s favor in overcoming 
executive privilege.281 
5.  Presidential Involvement  
The fifth factor is whether the President was personally involved.  The executive 
power is vested in the President, and the interest in confidentiality has its locus in the 
President.  The distinction between the presidential communications privilege and 
the deliberative process privilege, with the former being more powerful, supports 
making presidential involvement a factor.  Presidential involvement counsels in 
favor of confidentiality, as it raises a constitutional concern.  Without a 
constitutional concern, the courts have already held executive privilege sans 
presidential involvement to be merely common law in origin.282  If the courts 
adopted this factor it would provide a more coherent rationale for the distinction of 
the two forms of executive privilege and help integrate executive privileges into a 
unified doctrine.  
In the event of presidential involvement, the degree of that involvement becomes 
a subfactor.  There is an interest in presidential confidentiality, and the risk of 
disclosure being revelatory of presidential deliberations is positively correlated to the 
level of presidential involvement in any given situation.  The President seeing one 
memorandum on an issue does not entail the same degree of confidentiality interest 
as the President having a dozen meetings with his senior advisers to discuss that 
same issue.  The more involved the President is, the stronger this factor counsels in 
favor of confidentiality.  
6.  Nature of Other Actors  
The sixth factor is the nature of the actors aside from the President.  Not all non-
presidential actors are equal in terms of executive privilege.  There are five 
subfactors under this heading that form a continuum, and as one progresses through 
that continuum the interest in presidential confidentiality decreases while the interest 
in congressional discovery increases.  
The first subfactor, with the strongest interest in confidentiality, is the Vice 
President of the United States.  The Supreme Court has held that the Vice President 
shares in executive privilege.283  The Vice President is an independent constitutional 
officer, specifically named in Article II.  Although the textual grants of authority to 
the Vice President seem minor, the Vice President‟s status as a constitutional officer 
nonetheless renders him utterly independent of Congress.284  Also, the Vice President 
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 282 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 749-50 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Ass‟n of Am. Physicians & 
Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 283 See Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 385 (2004).  
 284 It is true that the Vice President is also an officer of Congress as the President of the 
Senate.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.  However, that Office is entirely distinct from his 
executive office and does nothing to undermine the complete independence of the Vice 
President in his executive capacity from the legislative branch.  
2010] MAKING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE WORK 71 
 
is by statute a member of the National Security Council,285 vesting him with a 
significant national security portfolio.  Additionally, recent administrations give the 
appearance of the Vice President being heavily involved in senior-level presidential 
deliberations.  And unlike the President‟s other advisers, which serve at the pleasure 
of the President and can therefore be replaced at will to shield the President, the Vice 
President holds his office for a period coterminous with the President, creating a 
unique concern for confidentiality.  
The second subfactor is, within government personnel, whether the actor is a 
Senate-confirmed employee.  There is actually an argument on both sides of this 
factor.  The first is that Senate-confirmed employees are principal officers instead of 
inferior officers286 and as such are closer in proximity to the President.  The closer 
the proximity to the President, the greater the interest is in confidentiality.  The 
counterargument is that the Senate‟s confirmation of the individual gives Congress 
an enhanced interest in holding him accountable.  This may be true, but if so that 
would apply only to Senate oversight.  Restricting the scope of the argument for a 
moment to the House, Senate-confirmed employees should enjoy greater executive-
privilege protection.287  
The third subfactor is, within appointed personnel, commissioned officers versus 
non-officers.  This has the same concern given under the second subfactor.  On one 
hand government officers that are not Senate confirmed can be considered closer to 
the President and therefore be attended by a greater interest in privilege, while on the 
other hand those offices are created by Congress, and so Congress can assert an 
interest in accountability.  On balance, however, this should be seen as an exercise of 
the President‟s express appointment power, which mentions inferior officers but 
does not mention governmental appointees of lower rank that are not officers.  
Therefore, this counsels in favor of confidentiality.  
The fourth subfactor is, within governmental personnel, appointed individuals 
versus career individuals.  Appointed individuals should have a greater interest in 
confidentiality because they are beneficiaries of the President‟s appointment power, 
showing a textual commitment to the President in the Constitution.  Other 
government employees hold their jobs only under congressional authority and 
appropriations, which counsels in favor of congressional oversight.  These 
employees enjoyment of civil service protection solely as a grant of congressional 
action augments Congress‟s interest in being able to subject these employees to 
oversight.  
The fifth subfactor is government personnel versus the private sector.  
Employees of the executive branch are—at least from a constitutional perspective—
ultimately carrying out the agenda of the chief executive.  Employees of the private 
sector, although they can contract with a government entity to carry out programs 
and actions for the executive, are not by their nature subordinates to the President.  
                                                          
 285 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 496 (codified as amended at 
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Therefore, private sector involvement counsels strongly in favor of disclosure to 
Congress. 
7.  Czars 
A new element in the governmental structure that could be listed as a subfactor 
of the previous heading, but has become a factor in its own right under this heading, 
is whether the officer is a “czar.”  There is a distinction between White House staff 
versus personnel in an agency or department.  The White House exists as a 
constitutional imperative, whereas no other executive-branch entity can make such a 
claim.288  Within this framework, there is a separation between the roles of White 
House personnel versus other executive officers.  The former are advisory in nature, 
whereas the latter exercise operational management through administrative action 
and implementing the President‟s directions.  
To the extent that a czar is a White House adviser with no powers other than that 
of any other adviser, there is no difference in terms of executive privilege.  Similarly, 
if a person is called a czar, but is in fact a Senate-confirmed principal officer, the 
moniker of “czar” is again of no moment.  (For example, the director of the White 
House Office of National Drug Control Policy is called the “drug czar,” but in reality 
is a Senate-confirmed officer occupying an office created by an act of Congress.289)  
So that is to say, if someone is called a czar but in fact is otherwise indistinguishable 
from other political appointees in the executive branch, then there is no 
constitutional concern regarding that appointee‟s status.  
But a President cannot have his cake and eat it, too.  No President can create a 
governmental office without congressional authorization if that office exercises 
executive authority.  Even if such an office exists, no President can then appoint any 
person to hold such an office, unless Congress by statute authorizes him to do so.290  
And if that person wields sufficient stature or power to be regarded as a principal 
officer, then Senate must first confirm that person.291  So if a President names a czar 
who is anything other than a White House adviser—a person who exercises any 
government authority over any public or private person or entity—then such a 
person has no lawful protection for his actions, and as such, this factor strongly 
counsels in favor of disclosure. 
This factor should weigh heavily in favor of disclosure because of the inherent 
illegitimacy of such czars whenever they engage in operational management.  For 
example, take so-called “terrorism czar” John Brennan, who is President Obama‟s 
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Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.292  
A terrorist referred to in the media as the “underwear bomber” attempted to detonate 
an explosive device onboard a transatlantic flight shortly before the airliner landed in 
Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.293  Shortly after the incident the Director of the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) asked Mr. Brennan if the Director should 
prematurely end his skiing vacation with his son and return to Washington, D.C., to 
take up his post at the NCTC; Mr. Brennan told the Director that he could continue 
on his vacation.294  
Rather than acting as an adviser to the President, here, Mr. Brennan was 
assuming operational control of a situation and issuing instructions to a Senate-
confirmed official managing an executive agency.  Yet, Mr. Brennan was never 
confirmed by the Senate, and for that matter his office was never created or 
sanctioned by Congress.  He was acting completely outside the constitutional 
framework, wielding extraordinary power without any public accountability.  Such 
accountability is the quintessential hallmark of the rationales underlying the 
Appointments Clause.295  To allow such exertions of power by someone who is 
neither elected through the democratic process (the President) nor subject to 
congressional oversight and confirmation (principal officers) circumvents critical 
constitutional safeguards that serve as a check on governmental power.  Individuals 
acting as de facto principal officers in the name of the President should be 
completely unprotected by executive privilege and fully answerable to Congress.  
Again, with the exception of “czars” acting as executive-branch officers asserting 
operational authority, none of these factors or subfactors is intrinsically dispositive.  
But, by adopting a framework with all of these factors, the courts can establish a 
general theory with which to evaluate all executive privilege claims, providing 
coherency and predictability to how a court will adjudicate executive privilege 
claims.  
V.  COURTS SHOULD REFUSE BOTH RECENTLY-OFFERED SOLUTIONS IN FAVOR OF AN 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
A case study can help demonstrate how this approach would work in litigation.  
In the recent Miers case, neither party‟s arguments were persuasive; thus, courts 
should accordingly decline to adopt either position.  The core thesis of both the 
White House position and Congress‟s position was flawed.  There may be no way to 
restore the status quo ante; this litigation confirmed the need for the judiciary to 
draw a clear line regarding executive privilege, which in the Miers case specifically 
concerned when the President is discussing an exercise of his explicit constitutional 
power with his immediate White House advisers.  And while it is obvious that the 
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executive branch would benefit from such a holding, the judicial branch and even the 
legislative branch would benefit as well.  
A.  Courts Should Reject Both Proposed Arguments 
Both the White House (via the Justice Department) and the U.S. House (through 
the Judiciary Committee) presented arguments in the Miers case that are likely the 
same basic arguments that will be raised in future lawsuits involving executive 
privilege.  For purposes of analysis, this Article ignores threshold issues such as 
standing and justiciability, focusing on the merits of executive-privilege assertions.  
1.  Congressional Arguments 
Congress makes the obvious arguments.  Regarding the Judiciary Committee, the 
House argues that a person must appear before a committee in order to assert 
privilege.296  It argues that there is no immunity for former presidential aides,297 
because the President himself is not immune from testifying.298  Assuming arguendo 
there is immunity, it is still not absolute immunity.  Congressional Democrats also 
alleged in Miers that replacing federal prosecutors potentially undermines criminal 
investigations.299  The Committee claimed that these hearings were investigative of 
whether corrective legislation was required.300 
Several of these arguments are flawed or incorrect.  Justice Jackson once said in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Steel Seizure Case, that, like those seeking 
to defeat executive privilege assert in recent litigation, “[p]residential claim to a 
power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for 
what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”301  That 
case was inapposite in Miers (though it would seem relevant to a President asserting 
that a czar exercising executive power need not testify before Congress).  In 
Youngstown, President Truman was making legislation by executive fiat in ordering 
the Secretary of Commerce to seize steel production facilities; he was merging both 
the legislative and executive powers.  Making legislation requires the cooperation of 
both elected branches.302  Here, the question concerns the prerogatives of the 
executive vis-à-vis Congress; rather than a cooperative issue and a question of 
enacting policy, it is an adversarial issue with no policy elements. 
The Committee asserted that Mr. Bolten and Ms. Miers must comply with the 
subpoena, and argues that the idea of any executive official not being subject to such 
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subpoenas is without precedent.  Those who note that during the early years of 
republic congressional subpoenas were not second-guessed by the judiciary also 
acknowledge that this practice of acquiescing to legislative inquiries was inherited 
from the English system,303 a system wherein Parliament is supreme.304  Thus, the 
system we inherited was one in which the executive was always required to answer 
to the legislature.  
2.  White House Arguments 
The true party-in-interest in executive-privilege cases is the President of the 
United States.  The named parties in the Miers suit were Harriet Miers and Joshua 
Bolten.  All litigation on their behalf was handled by the Department of Justice.  Yet 
these suits concern the President‟s use of his constitutional authority, the executive 
privilege at issue is held by the President and asserted by the President, and each of 
the defendants and potential defendants are being targeted solely for their interaction 
and relationship with the President.  Therefore, the true party here is the President. 
The White House argued such cases are nonjusticiable.  It argued that the courts 
lack jurisdiction because the House lacks standing to sue.305  It also argued, assuming 
arguendo that there is standing, the House lacks a cause of action.306  Another 
alternative argument was that, assuming there is a cause of action, the court should 
refuse to decide this matter and should decline to exercise jurisdiction on equitable 
grounds.307 
Each of those issues is beyond the scope of this Article, except that issues of 
standing and causes of action were touched upon earlier to set the context for the 
reluctance to adjudicate that the judiciary should show on executive privilege clashes 
between coordinate branches.  Regarding the political question doctrine, where 
courts decline to exercise jurisdiction because the conflict is of a nature that ought to 
be decided by the two political branches,308 the D.C. Circuit has held that “neither 
the political question doctrine nor any close adaptation thereof is appropriate where 
neither of the conflicting political branches has a clear and unequivocal 
constitutional title, and it is or may be possible to establish an effective judicial 
settlement.”309  Because executive privilege is derived from implied—not express—
constitutional powers on both sides, there is no unequivocal constitutional title.  This 
is consistent with Supreme Court guidance that “the presence of constitutional issues 
with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the political 
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question doctrine.”310  Thus, the political question doctrine does not apply in the 
D.C. Circuit, though it would pose a question of first impression for the Supreme 
Court.  
On the merits, the White House argued in Miers that senior aides should be 
absolutely immune from congressional subpoenas, such that the adviser need not 
appear before the Committee.311  This argument may have some force from a 
separation-of-powers perspective, but any White House “claim of absolute immunity 
from compelled congressional process . . . is without any support in the case law.”312  
Instead, it is for the courts to determine the scope and application of executive 
privilege.313  Consistent with longstanding precedent, current case law requires that 
executive privilege questions be resolved on the return of the subpoena and does not 
allow the executive branch to simply disregard subpoenas on a claim of immunity 
from testifying.314  The Miers district court thus left question-specific assertions of 
executive privilege as the only acceptable application of the privilege in 
circumstances such as these.  The court noted with seeming approval that other 
witnesses in the recent investigations employed this question-by-question assertion 
of executive privilege, citing the example of one Bush White House political 
director.315  
Yet the executive has often asserted this position of absolute immunity from 
judicial process.  Administrations of both parties therefore maintain that senior 
White House officials—those that directly advise the President—should always be 
covered by executive privilege and not even be required to testify before 
Congress.316  (Such an assertion has never been made by an operational manager 
whose offices are situated in the White House without congressional authorization, 
leaving previous arguments inapposite regarding “czars.”)  Such senior advisers are 
immune because they are essentially alter egos of the President, as the Clinton 
Justice Department argued.317  Therefore, as far as the law is concerned, when the 
President deliberates with such a senior adviser, he is essentially talking to himself.  
Additionally, the Reagan Justice Department argued that executive branch 
officials who refuse to testify due to a presidential assertion of executive privilege 
cannot be prosecuted for contempt either by a federal prosecutor or Congress.318  But 
immunity from criminal prosecution is one thing, whereas immunity from civil 
discovery pursuant to court order is another.  Although the courts have not 
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definitively spoken on the question, the Clinton Justice Department considered the 
question.  “Subjecting a senior presidential advisor to the congressional subpoena 
power would be akin to requiring the President himself to appear before Congress on 
matters relating to the performance of his constitutionally assigned executive 
functions.”319  The Justice Department under President George W. Bush adopted that 
position verbatim.320 
The Supreme Court has held that the President is absolutely immune from 
damages for his official actions,321 while holding that top White House advisers only 
enjoy qualified immunity from damages for their official actions.322  This does not 
dispositively prove that such presidential advisers do not share presidential immunity 
from testifying, as there may be a rationale for fully transferring presidential 
protection regarding deliberations but not regarding damages, but it nonetheless cuts 
against the idea of presidential advisers wielding comprehensive protection against 
compelled testimony.323  Although there is now a D.C. District precedent that such 
aides do not enjoy comprehensive protection,324 the question remains open for the 
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court.  
Finally, the White House argues that courts should not decide these claims 
because adjudication “would inexorably alter the separation of powers and forever 
change how the political branches deal with each other.”325  That argument fails for 
the reasons set forth in Part V.B below.  
B.  Superior Alternative Approach for the Recent Controversies 
The courts should not accept either set of arguments.  The courts should reject 
White House contentions that executive-privilege claims are not justiciable, finding 
instead that under circumstances such as those described in Miers, Congress has 
standing and such assertions of privilege are also in all other respects justiciable.  
The courts should thus reach the merits of the case.  In reaching the merits, the 
courts should reject Congress‟s arguments when senior White House advisers are 
conversing with the President on his express constitutional powers, not limited to 
commander-in-chief.  But as the other factors considered above are introduced, such 
as matters involving so-called czars that exercise executive authority without express 
congressional authorization, Congress should start to be able to overcome assertions 
of privilege and perform congressional oversight duties.  
The D.C. Circuit has determined that “the resolution of conflict between the 
coordinate branches in these situations must be regarded as an opportunity for a 
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constructive modus vivendi, which positively promotes the functioning of our 
system.”326  Such opportunities may arise in the coming years.  The courts should 
issue a clear ruling that conversations between the President and members of his 
advisory White House staff concerning the exercise of an Article II power expressly 
granted to the President are privileged, and it is difficult to posit a justification so 
compelling that it could override the President‟s interest in confidentiality.  But in 
many other circumstances such confidentiality becomes less central to the 
constitutional scheme, and eventually tips in favor of Congress as the people‟s 
representatives to hold the President accountable.  
The judiciary should apply the rationale employed by the Gravel Court to White 
House advisers,327 so long as those advisers are truly advisory, as they serve in the 
White House Office in the same fashion that congressional staffers serve in the 
members‟ offices.  Both act as alter egos of the elected official in whose office they 
serve.  In the alternative, White House staff of senior rank should be held alter egos 
of the President regarding presidential action.  Even more narrowly, such staff could 
alternatively be found to be alter egos when they are conversing with the President.  
At a minimum, White House aides of senior rank should be considered alter egos of 
the President regarding conversations they have directly with the President if those 
conversations concern the President‟s use of an Article II power, as such 
conversations go to the core exercise of the President‟s power by conferring with 
extensions of his constitutional office regarding the discharge of his constitutional 
functions.  The courts could even narrow such a holding further yet, by limiting its 
scope to situations where there is no substantial showing of criminal wrongdoing.  
This would obviously not help in situations where credible criminal allegations are 
implicated.  Such a provision would leave intact the case law from the Watergate 
era, while reducing the likelihood of threats of litigation springing from unremitting 
and unending investigations of the executive branch during times of heightened 
partisan tension.  
The courts should attach special importance to presidential deliberations 
regarding an Article II power.  The brevity of Article II‟s text leaves a great deal 
open to inference and interpretation.  Executive orders that carry the force of law but 
that codify policy in a manner similar to statutes raise questions as to the limits of 
unilateral executive policymaking.  The President entering into executive agreements 
with other nations,328 without either submitting the agreement to the Senate as a 
treaty that requires a two-thirds vote for ratification,329 aggressively asserts the 
President‟s foreign policy powers.  Certainly there are aspects of the modern 
administrative state that can raise those concerns.  But there are also core powers 
committed to the President—and to him alone—by the Constitution.  Although the 
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Court has at times not focused on that fact as a rigid basis for decision,330 a growing 
emphasis on textualism in recent years should lead to a robust protection of the 
President‟s confidentiality in discussing express Article II actions with his senior 
advisory staff, just as this emphasis might call for a reexamination of various other 
areas of recent government practice that might be at odds with the constitutional 
framework.  
Only one rationale is obvious as to why the White House would not advocate for 
this position and instead encourage the court to not reach the merits of the case: the 
White House is not confident it would receive an outcome better than the status quo.  
The White House is concerned that in addressing the merits of executive privilege 
cases, the judiciary will allow for a requirement that the White House senior staff to 
provide at least some information.  Alternatively, the White House could fear that 
the courts would fashion a new framework or rule of law, and this framework could 
be even less desirable to the White House than the status quo.  Or perhaps the White 
House would be compelled to provide the information to a judge for an in camera 
inspection for the judge to determine what is privileged.  Thus, in the spirit of the 
popular axiom of “better the devil you know,” the White House would rather the 
courts not engage in executive privilege.  
But this approach is mistaken. Recent lawsuits over executive privilege have 
become acrimonious and degrade relations between the political branches.  If not 
clearly resolved by the judiciary, such suits will only encourage more litigation to 
the point that it would become a tiresome next step that could be expected whenever 
a future President attempts to assert confidentiality.  By reaching the merits of a case 
involving these controversies, the courts can restore appropriate balance of 
protection for presidential deliberations with Congress‟s need for information to 
perform oversight, regardless of party.  This could in turn help generate goodwill 
between the political branches essential for optimal interbranch relations as 
contemplated by the Constitution‟s tripartite framework.  
The lawsuits discussed in this Article from the George W. Bush presidency were 
a continuation of various cases litigated during the Clinton presidency.  The same 
could now happen with the Obama presidency.  These overlapping scandals eroded 
executive privilege.331  The Court rejected any “protective function privilege” for 
Secret Service agents that until that point had been theorized as an aspect of 
executive privilege.332  White House staff protections—including executive 
privileges involving the White House Counsel‟s Office—were diminished.333  
Commenting on the narrowing of executive privilege, Professor Turley expressed 
concern as to how these cases weakened the presidency.334  To be fair, two 
distinctive differences between Clinton‟s assertions of executive privilege and those 
of earlier administrations were that Clinton freely asserted the privilege and did so 
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even for unofficial matters, whereas prior Presidents were reluctant to assert it and 
even then did so only regarding official actions.335  Professors Jonathan Turley and 
Nelson Lund credit part of this damage to Bernard Nussbaum, Clinton‟s first White 
House counsel, for failing to maintain proper boundaries between President 
Clinton‟s official activities versus private activities by working on matters that 
stemmed from the President‟s personal matters.336  This left the courts to draw lines 
excluding such private activities from executive-privilege protection.  But they were 
nonetheless executive privilege cases.  And the defeat of several executive-privilege 
assertions by President Clinton saddled future administrations with a disadvantage 
against congressional investigators.337 
Such controversies, if they bear fruit for an opposition Congress, will only 
continue this aggravation between the branches and further embolden a Congress 
controlled by the opposition party to push the envelope on investigatory limits.  Even 
if no illegalities are involved, it is “inherent in the nature of presidential 
communications that they often could prove embarrassing if publicly released: that is 
a fundamental reason for the very existence of the privilege.”338  
Of course, when Congress is entitled to the information in question, then 
aggressive congressional action ought to result in the acquisition of the sought-after 
material.  And all this plays out on a political stage, where both the President and his 
congressional opponents choose to tackle the rigorous challenges of political life in 
our democratic system.  It should be no surprise to any student of American politics 
that “[a] President‟s political adversaries can be expected to seek presidential 
communications and executive branch deliberative information for the very reason 
that public disclosure might prove embarrassing to the President.”339  
C.  All Three Government Branches—Including Congress—Will Benefit from not 
Allowing Congress to Be Involved with Executive Branch Appointment Decisions 
It would go without saying—except that it must be said in a law review article—
that a correct application of executive privilege in a case such as Miers would benefit 
the executive branch.  Upholding executive privilege, as this Article advocates, 
would strengthen the position of the President vis-à-vis Congress, by making 
confidential private conversations with White House advisory officials regarding 
how the President should use his appointment power.  What is less likely to be 
considered—but equally true—is that the judiciary will benefit as well, as will 
Congress.  
The benefit to the judiciary is obvious.  If the courts do not welcome such suits 
that require consideration of individualized assertions of executive privilege, the 
D.C. District and D.C. Circuit do not run the risk of regularly facing cases that 
require extensive discovery into executive branch conversations, each of which must 
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go through a number of stages before it can be considered by a court.  Furthermore, 
each would then require a detailed process with the presiding judge determining 
which parts, if any, are covered by executive privilege, and such determinations 
could constitute complex fact patterns.  Upholding clear executive privilege rules 
that do not require frequent judicial involvement would minimize courts‟ decision 
costs, conserving scarce judicial resources. 
The alternative, allowing suits to proceed in a manner that requires substantial 
judicial involvement, would be a burden to the courts.  If a court allows a subpoena 
requiring a presidential adviser to appear to be enforced—leaving executive 
privilege to be asserted on a per-question basis during the course of the committee 
hearing—the only way a federal judge can then rule on the propriety of any given 
assertion of the privilege is after (1) the official refuses to answer on the grounds that 
the answer is privileged, (2) the chairman rejects the assertion and orders the witness 
to answer, (3) the official flatly refuses to comply, (4) the chairman finds the official 
in contempt, (5) the full committee votes (possibly along party lines) to sustain the 
chairman‟s finding, (6) the matter is referred to the full House, (7) the full body 
votes for a contempt citation, (8) the Speaker certifies the contempt citation and 
refers it to federal prosecutors, (9) the Justice Department declines to prosecute, (10) 
the House authorizes a civil suit, (11) the authorized member of the House files suit, 
and (12) the parties argue before a federal judge whether executive privilege was 
properly asserted.  After the assertion, the judge (13) conducts an in camera 
inspection, (14) gives the executive an opportunity to submit more specified claims 
if certain material is not considered privileged, and then (15) supervises the release 
of whatever is still held not to be privileged.  That is quite a burden for each 
assertion of privilege.  And that burden should serve to discourage unnecessary 
litigation.  
Thus, courts should be reluctant to address claims between the coequal political 
branches, because leaving the branches to work out differences “positively promotes 
the functioning of our [constitutional] system.”340  The Constitution “contemplates a 
more restricted role for Article III courts” in resolving interbranch disputes.341  But 
there must be limits to such reluctance.  Leaving disputes to the political branches 
for resolution works—except when it doesn‟t.  And then what?  Once one or both 
branches escalate a situation into one that impairs the proper functioning of one or 
both branches, then the courts should restore the proper constitutional balance if the 
controversy turns on a constitutional question, as it does regarding executive 
privilege. 
The less obvious benefit is that such a holding would also benefit Congress.  The 
“Pottery Barn Rule,” as Secretary of State Colin Powell articulated it regarding the 
U.S. decision to go to war with Iraq, was “You break it, you own it.”342  With action 
comes responsibility.  Tort law includes the rule that, absent a special relationship, a 
person owes no duty to act for the benefit of another, but if they choose to act, they 
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will then be held accountable if they act negligently.343  The same holds true for 
elected leaders.  If an elected official has no hand in an action that goes awry, then 
the public usually gives him a free hand to condemn it.  But if the elected leader has 
knowledge of a matter, then often he will be held to account by the electorate for his 
use (or lack thereof) of that knowledge and can suffer consequences if matters 
concerning that knowledge go badly. 
Congress should be reluctant to welcome this level of accountability.  Looking at 
the Miers case, if Congress insists on being able to access presidential deliberations 
on appointments, Congress will share accountability with the President when one of 
those appointees fails.  The President makes approximately six thousand 
appointments through the White House Office of Presidential Personnel.344  This 
includes appointing 94 U.S. attorneys,345 the political office at the center of the Miers 
case.  A U.S. attorney‟s office typically requires forty to eighty employees.346 
Another entity dealing with staffing, the White House Office of Personnel 
Management, had a budget of over $331 million in Fiscal Year 2008.347  In order to 
protect its own interests, Congress would have to conduct due diligence into many 
applicants to assess whether that person poses a risk of not performing his duties 
well.  As such possibly-problematic appointees are identified, Congress must lodge 
objections with the White House against the appointment.  In order to conduct such 
due diligence, Congress would have to create its own staff to conduct its own 
investigations.  There would doubtless be redundancies between various oversight 
committees, as each committee could have different criteria for suspect nominees.  
And individual members may also want a staff person specifically dedicated to 
White House appointments, as any member may be unwilling to place his political 
interests in the hands of the committee chairman‟s vetting team.  Congress would be 
much better served by not engaging in that process at all and preserving its ability to 
simply condemn the White House for incompetence whenever a presidential 
appointee embarrasses the administration. 
The Senate shares accountability for performance, but not for the decision to 
appoint.  In confirmation, the Senate determines whether the nominee is fit for the 
office.  It does not inquire into what conversations the President had or what 
considerations motivated him to put forward that particular nominee.  Therefore, 
neither house of Congress has dealt with this level of accountability to date.  
Yet on countless other issues, congressional oversight is extremely important to 
hold an administration to account and thereby encourages the executive branch to 
focus its efforts on faithfully serving the American people through a conscientious 
performance of administrative duties.  Those who hold congressional office have 
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taken an office that is demanding; thus, members of Congress must exercise 
appropriate oversight regardless of political risk.  
VI.  CONCLUSION  
Most controversies between Congress and the White House over information are 
decided more by politics than by law, and so a settlement is usually reached favoring 
the party with the public wind to its back.348  Questions of law should not be decided 
in that fashion.  Therefore, the reach and scope of executive privilege should be 
settled by the courts in such situations, so that the President‟s power is not impaired 
whenever the political wind is in the President‟s face and at his opponents‟ backs, or 
the President is inappropriately shielded when political tides flow in his favor.  
While the best outcome in any interbranch dispute is the political branches 
reaching a settlement, “such compromise may not always be available, or even 
desirable.”349  It is not desirable where it sets a precedent that degrades one of the 
three branches of government.  If one branch of government demands something to 
which it is not constitutionally entitled and that the Constitution has fully vested in a 
coequal branch, the vested branch should not be required to negotiate on the 
question.  Negotiation usually involves compromise.  This negotiation would often 
result in one branch needing to cede to the other, encouraging additional 
unconstitutional demands in the future.  Though this may perhaps be a quicker route 
to a resolution, it disrupts the constitutional balance in government.  As the Supreme 
Court has recently explained, “„convenience and efficiency are not the primary 
objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.‟”350 
President Reagan declared that “you aren‟t President; you are temporarily 
custodian of an institution, the Presidency.  And you don‟t have any right to do away 
with any of the prerogatives of that institution, and one of those is executive 
privilege.  And this is what was being attacked by the Congress.”351  Thus, any White 
House has the obligation to fight to protect executive privilege, and the courts should 
draw the line to preserve that constitutional prerogative.  Likewise, there are times 
when it is the President who is refusing to give Congress its due under the 
Constitution, where Congress must assert its prerogatives for future generations. 
Conversely, where confidentiality is not warranted, courts must ensure public 
disclosure and accountability.  
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